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THE POLICY ORIGINS O F  MIGRATION 
IN ZAMBIA 
INTRODUCTION 
The pattern of migration in pos t-independence Zambia force­
fully suggests that large numbers of villagers perceive a differential 
between expected urban and rural incomes and that they respond to 
that differential by moving to the urban areas. 
vVhen we speak of the "urban sector" in Zambia, we speak of 
the copper mining towns in what is  appropriately named the Copper-
belt Province; of Ndola, the distributive and adminis trative center 
for that province; and of the major tow.ns of the Central and Southern 
Provinces: Kabwe, a lead and zinc mining town and the headquarters 
of Z ambia railways ; Lusaka, the national capital; and Livingstone, for­
merly the national capital, and now the site of Victoria Falls, an impor­
tant tourist center. These towns form a string of urban centers along the 
major  railway that bis e cts Z ambia from s outh to north. Because of this, 
we will adopt the local usage and refer both to thes e  towns and to the ad­
minis trative units in which they reside as  the "line of r.ail. 11 
At the time of the last major census before ind ependence (June 
1 963), the ten urban districts of Zambia contained 2 2 .  3 percent of the 
nation 's  population. The firs t post-independence census revealed that 
by August of 1969, 30. 4 percent of the population of 
·
Z ambia re­
sided in these urban districts. Over the six year period, the urban 
.Population had grown from approximately 778,000 to approxi­
mately 1,2 32,000 people ; this represented a growth of 
about 58 percent, as agains t an increase of about 16 percent 
in the national population as a whole. If i t  is a s s umed that 
international migration has had a negligible impact on the popu­
lation figures and that urban birthrates are  roughly s i mi lar 
to thos e in the rural areas , we can then attribute approximate ly 
40 percent of the change in the urban population to the in­
migration of persons from the countryside. 
An examination of the district level data sugges ts that 
the growth of the urban centers was part  of a general  shift 
in population to the line of rai l  in Zambia. In the following 
tabl e ,  we s ort  the c ensus enumerations into categories  r eflecting 
degrees of proximity to the urban districts . A s  we move further 
from the urban cente r s ,  we find decreasing per centages of 
population growth, thus implying los s of popul;,_tion to the t�wns . 
Indeed, noting that the percentage changes in population for 
Zambia as a whole was 16 . 2  percent, the population of the 
mor e  remote dis tri cts has grown in s ize at  a rate that implies  
approximately a 13  p e r cent los s  of  population due to  migration. 
We further note · that this figure declines and takes on pos itive 
values as \Ve move toward the towns . Again, this trend in 
the data implies that there  has been a concerted flow of 
people fron1 the mor e  remote,  rural dis tr icts toward the line 
of rail .  1 
2 3 
T A BLE 
Cens us of Census of Pe rcent Percent Change A tt ributable 
Line of R ail Province s :  June 1963 August 1969 Increas e to Migration
('00 0 )  ('  000 )  
U rban Dis tricts 778 1, 2 3 2  5 8 . 3  +42 . 1  
Peri-Urban Dis tricts 143 175 22 .3  + 6 . 2  
Rural Distri cts 5 94 617 3 . 8  - 12.4 
Off-Line-of-Rail Provinces :  
A ll Dis tricts 1, 975 2 ,  0 3 0  2.7 - 13 . 5  
Total Z ambia 3 , 490 4, 054 16 . 2  
Source:  
Note : 
R epublic  of Zambia, Monthly Diges t  o f  Statistics ,  vo l .  8 ,  no . 8,  
August 1972. Lusaka: Cent ral  Statis tical Office ,  Augus t 197 2 .  
And Mary E lizabeth Jackman, R ecent Population Movements i.n 
Zambia: Some Aspects of the 1969 Cens us (Master  of Science 
Dis s ertation, Univers ity of Zambia, January 1972 ) .  
T o  compute the percent change attributable to migration, we mus t  
as s ume a uniform rate o f  natura l  increas<:! throughout Zambia. 
This s hift in population, we contend, reflects the uneven 
distribution of economic opportunities in contemporary Zambia .  
T h e  caus e o f  the differenti a l  i n  wel l -being between the urban and 
rural s e ctors ls the pattern of economic development in the country
a pattern that exis ted prior to independence in 1964, and that has been 
exacerbated s ince that time . It i s  to this pattern of development 
that we now turn. 
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II 
ECONOMIC BACKGR OUND IN THE COL ONIAL E R A
T h e  P rivate Sec tor: 
The differential between the line of rail and the 
res t  of the country finds its O!:'igin in the investments 
in  mining in Central Africa in the early twentieth century, and from 
the s er ie s  of p rivate investment decisions that ·r e s u lted  from the foun­
d ing of the mining. industry. 
The fir s t  comme r cially viable mine in Zambia was the Broken 
Hil l  Development Company, a lead and zinc mining company located in Broken 
Hill and owned in part by the British South Africa Compan y  {BSA ) .  The 
mine was developed in the early 1 900's ; but its progress  was hinderec;l 
by the lack of transport.  The BSA, however , held monopoly r ights to 
the construction of railways in B ritish Centr a l  and Southern Africa 
as  well a s  to the minerals  in that area .  As a r esult, the company 
found it  profitable to inves t  in the extens ion of a rail  link to Broken Hil l  
in  1 906 ;  as a major s ha r eholder in the companies that controlled the 
two indus trie s ,  the BSA was in a position to capture both the benefits 
to the mines from the provis ion of rail  transport and the benefits 
to the rai lways of the demand for transportation s e rvices 
from the mine s .  It ther efore backed the inve s tment. 
The rail  link from Rhodesia to Broken Hil l  was but the firs t  
s tage in the construction of the line o f  rail. T h e  link t o  the Congo
border ca.me soon after,  In the ear ly 1 90 0 ' s ,  the U nion Mini'ere 
a l r eady had mines under production in Katanga , and it needed smelting 
c oke from the BSA's mines at Wankie; moreover ,  the Congolese  mines 
r equired  a r ai l  outlet  to the s ea until the comp letion of their own 
r ai lway to the coasta l  ports of A ngola,  On the bas is of an agreement 
with the BSA , the Congo les e firm was granted permis s ion to link 
the Broken Hill  rail line with the Congo border in 1 9 0 9 .  With the 
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development of the copp e r  mines in Northern R hodesia in the 1 9 20 ' s ,
this portion of the railway its elf became profi table, handling the outward 
flow of copper to the s ea and the inbound shipment of coa l to the copper 
companie s ,  The rai lways ther efore cons tructed spur line s  to the var ious 
copper mines in the 1 9 20 ' s  and ear ly 1 9 30 ' s  and their cons truction s ig-
nalled the  completion of Z ambia's line of rai l ,  
While  the BSA s ubsequently dives ted operation of the railways to 
an independently incorpora ted fir m, . the mining companie s  and railways 
continued to maintain mutually advantage ous agreements . T hus , the 
mines agreed to contracts with the railways that included penalty c laus es  
to  ins ure the  us e of  the rai lways for the  export of ore ,  whi l e  the railways 
offered in exchange highly favorable shipping rates to the mines .  In 
addition, the mining companies r epeated ly loaned funds to the rai lways 
at favorabie terms for the p urcha s e  of rolling s tock and the upgrading 
. 1 . t 2of capita equ1pmen . 
Just  as the mining s e ctor had called forth inves tments in the 
r·ai!ways , so too did it ca l l  forth invest ments in other s e c to r s, Among 
the firs t  of the s e  was agriculture .  Farming initial ly developed from 
the line of rai l  in the 1 9201s , and the princip a l  market for the major 
agricultural products of that time - - maize and beef catt l e  - - wer e  
the ·coppe r  companies of Katanga.  The extension o f  the tobac co market 
from the R hodesias in the late 1 9 201s gave the farmers a source of 
revenues apart from the mines , Nonetheles s ,  the mine market con ­
tinued to cons ume a. major share of the agricultural p rodu c e . Thus , 
. according to Baldwin, in 1 93 7 ,  " the mines purchased 80 p e r cent of 
the beef consumed in the territory, and even in  1 95 9  the mining areas 
consumed 5 0  percent of the total livestock s laughtered for comme r c ia l  
markets .  11 A t  that time, the mines  a l s o  purcha s ed about 2 5  p er c en t  
o f  the internal maize s ales  b y  comme rcial  farmers ,
3 
The  mine s ,  
and the creation o f  the demand for food associated with the i r  deve lop ­
ment, thus gave the initial impetus t o  the formation of  comme rcial  
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agr iculture and r.emained major  consumers of its output. 
It s hould be noted that the center s  of agricu ltural  production 
thems elves clus t ered along the railways. T h e  primary reason was 
that the companies and the government realized that farming could 
mos t  profitably be undertaken a long the railway and promoted 
European s ett lement there .  The government legalized the  a lienation 
of land to farmers along the line of rail under freehold conditions 
w h i c h  o ff e r e d security to far m  investment s ;  thes e  terms 
wer e  not offered for other areas of the country, which were left 
large ly under conditions of native tenure ,  and where the duration
o f  l e a s e h o l d  a g r e e m ent s w a s  too s hor.t to warrant 
major investment s .  The effe ct was t o  p rovide a legal  underpinning 
to what market for ces already had guaranteed -- the restriction of 
highly capitalized farming to the narrow central band of Zambia, 
proximate to the railway. This would but add to the growing disparity 
in e conomic activity between that area and the res t  of the nation. 4 
Highly p rofitable mineral  production created the incentive 
for investments in other s e ctors .  A mong the mos t  important of 
thes e was the power indus try. We have already seen that a primary 
motivation for the construction of the railway was to provide the 
mines access to Wankie coal,  But the co llieries quickly proved 
insufficient to meet  their needs , and the companie s  soon invested in 
alternative ene r gy sources . The first  such venture was a hydro­
e le c tric facility at the Mulungus hi R iver in 1 925;  the second, a dam 
at Lus emfwa, was completed during the Second World War.  Following 
the war, the mining companies col laborated in the development of an 
integrated ele ctrical supply, the R hodesian- Congo Border Power 
Corporation, and partially linked their energy grid with that of the 
Union Minie�e. T his  was but a temporary expedient, however ;  for 
afterward s ,  the companies invested heavi ly in the construction of 
the Kariba hydroe l ectric dam. The dam was begun in 1 955 and began 
s upplying powe r in  19 58 .  With its completion came the end of the 
for mation of the power industry in the pre-independence period in 
Zambia -- an industry which s o ld over 60 percent of its output to 
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the mines . 
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T he growth of the mines, the railways , the power  industry - -
a l l  the s e  developments i n  the industrial  sector entr ained fur ther private 
investment. For example,  the creation of new hydroelectric capacity 
made profitable investments in the ce ment industry in Northern Rhodesia; 
with the backing of the Commonwea lth Development Corporation, a 
facility for producing cement , largely destined for the Kariba Dam, 
was constructed outside Lusaka. In addition, a series of firms grew 
up about the mines : engineering s e rvic e s ,  construction and mechanical 
r ep airs ,  and the manufacture of steel and metal products uti l ized by 
the mining companies . By the 1 9501s, the mines had also become the 
larges t single purchas er of acid s ,  chemicals;  and quarry products in 
the country and a principal  purchaser  of printing s ervies and wearing 
appare l .  As Ba ldwin wrote concerning the mid-1 95 0's , "There are 
few domes t ic  manufacturing activities left to be counted,  once the 
local  indus trie3 from whic h the copper  companies make significant 
6 pu:rchases are enumerated ."  
A imed as they were  at s upplying the  mines and the urban 
consumer market which the mines had created, it is not surprising 
that the s e  indus trie s  concentrated in the mining towns along the line 
of rail.  Thus , in a census of indus trial and manufac.turing e s tabli s h-
1nents s hortly after indepe ndence ,  the new government found that 
over 95 p e r c ent were located on the line of rail. 7 N aturally,  the
dis tribution of employment opportunitie.�.followed the s a me pattern. 
Jus t prior to independence,  including the publi c  s ector,  over 80 
per cent of the jobs were located in provinces on the line of  r ail. 
But nea r ly 60 percent of the population lived in the more r e mote 
p rovinces . 
TABLE 2 
Employment and Population, 1963  · 
E mployment 
Per cent of 
T otal Population 
8 
Percent of 
T otal 
Line of R ai l  P rovinces : 
C oppe r  belt 1 1 9 ,  720 46.7  544,200 1 5 .6 
C entral Province 5 9 , 590 2 3 . 2  5 0 5  , 5 0 0  1 4.5  
Southern Province 34, 750  1 3. 5  466 ,300  1 3 .4 
T otal, Line of R ai l  2 1 4, 060  8 3 . 5  1 ,5 1 6 , 000  43 .4  
O ther Provinces 42, 230 1 6 .4 1 , 974,800 5 6 . 6  
T otal 
Source: 
Note: 
256 , 29 0  9 9 . 9  3 ,490 ,000 100.0 
M. D. Veitch, "Employment and the Labour Force,  R egional Analys is ,  1 1
typescript,  n. p . ,  21 July, 1970 , table I. 
Percentages will not total becaus e vf rounding. 
For a rural population wanting to become better off in pre­
independence Zambia,  the urban s ector was ther efore  an attractive 
place to which to move . A d ding to the disparity between the urban and 
rural areas and reinforcing the incentive to migrate was the conduct 
of the public s ector .  
The Public Sector:  
It is  not uncommon, indeed it is characteristic,  of the public 
s ector that it will undertake inves tments that profit -maximizing indivi­
duals would ignore ,  Public goods are one category of such investments , 
and of cours e  the Northern R hodesian government did furnish the public 
9 
goods  a s s o�iated with all governments everywhere:  law and orde r ,  
education, roads, and other s e rvice s .  Another category o f  such invest-· 
ments are  investments in s ectors where the r eturns are  below the market 
rate of r e turn, but where  noneconomic incentives make thes e  allo·cations 
des irable from the government ' s  point of view. One incentive for the 
production of " s uboptimal" investments is a conception of  the public 
good; this gives priority to allocations in s ectors  which, while economi ­
cally marginal, �r e  nonethe les s  highly value d  i n  terms of  the officia l  
.ideology. A nother incentive is the need for political support .  Jus t  as 
p rice s ignals call forth allocations from p r ivate deci s ion-maker s ,  so too 
do political s ignal s ,  s uch as votes ,  call forth allocations from public 
officials .  
In Z ambia,  the major sphere in which inves tments produc.e less 
than the market rate of re turn is , of cours e ,  the area off the 
line of rail .  And the colonial government did have incentives to inves t  
the r e .  Its ideology was that o f  a protectorate,  and it w a s  concerned 
with the promotion of the well- being of the African population, mos t  
of whom lived in the rural areas . It officially endor s e d  the Passfi e ld 
Memorandum, which defined the interests of the black A fricans as 
8 paramount. Given that the majority of the A fricans r e mained in the
rural areas , this point of view i mplied a budgetary p riority for invest-
ment s .  
F o r  the greater part  o f  its exi s tence, however, the government of 
Northern R hodes ia had few funds for inves tment in any s e ctor.  T he 
dep r es s ion of the 1 9 3 01s deprived the governme nt of r evenues with 
which to do more than maintain the barest  e s s entials in public services ;  
for  the duration of the  rece s s ion, it confine d  i ts  functions largely to  
the  maintenance of law and order  and to the  col lection of taxe s .  N o  
s ooner did the rece s s ion r ecede than the government was overtaken 
by the Second World War; and during the war, it was comp e lled to 
reorder its budgetary priorities to conform to the needs of the rrre tropole. 
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In p ractice ,  this meant that the government surrendered much of its 
revenues in the for m  of interest-free loans for the war effort to Great 
Britain and utilized most of the r evenues that did r emain for the 
mobili zation of its populace rather than for development purpos es .  
It was not  until the pos t-war era that the government 
w a s  i n  a p o s i t i o n to commit s ignificant amounts of public funds .  
It set forth its  goal s  in 1 947 in  a T en- Year Development P lan. The 
p lan r estated the government ' s  commitment to its protectorate role;  
its determination to advance the interests of the largely non-ur ban, 
non-industrial African population; and ther efor e  its commitment to 
making significant public investments in the rural areas . In the 
s phere of education,  1 1 .8 p e rcent of the planned expenditur e  was to 
go to A frican education, and thus neces sari ly p r i marily to the rural 
s ector . A full ZO p e r c ent of the p lanned capital expenditures was to
go to agriculture ,  rural marketing,  for estry, and veter inary services, 
while involving European farme r s , the se  activities  nonetheless also impinged 
upon the p r imary productive activity of the Afric_an population. And an 
additional 1 1 . 5 percent was aimed at rural development activities 
� �· and thus clearly was intended for investments outs ide of the
urban secto r .  A ltogether ,  the p lan unambiguously assigned a full 3 3 ,  4 
per cent of its expenditures to the rural areas ; and in other budgetary 
c ategorie s ,  such as health, communications , building, and public 
works , it earmarked funds for a ctiviti e s  that als o involved Africans 
off the l ine of rail. 
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It was thus the intention of government to al locate public fund� 
in the areas ignored  by the private s e ctor ,  and thus partial ly to offset 
the dispar ity in the opportunities for economic wel l -being that had 
developed between the urban and rural sectors . This commitment 
was restated a decade later in a supple mentary p lan specifically aimed 
at the deve lopment of the Nort hern Province (now Northern and Luapula 
Provinces ) . The plan called for an exceptionally high level of 
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expenditure in areas thought to be particularly poor by comparison with 
the urban cente r s ,  the level of r elative poverty having been signale d  
to
 
government by the magnitude o f  labor migration from thes e  areas . lO
The colonial government did not exist  in a vacuum, however .  
I t  operated within a constitutiona l order that vested influence over its 
decis ions to certain constituencies in the p r otectorate . Its major 
constituency was of cours e  the immigrant-s ettle r  population which had 
been attracted to the country by the economic opportunities cr eated by 
coppe r  mining. Naturally, given their r e asons for being in the ter r i ­
tory in the first place ,  the s e  s ettlers largely confined themselves to 
the line of rai I. 
TABLE 3 
1 946 1 1 95 1
2 
Numb e r  of Percent of Number of Percent of 
Province Europeans Europeans Europeans Europeans 
Line of R ai l  Provinces 
Copper belt 1 1 ,  7 ZS 5 3.8 1 0 , 027  27.0 
C entral 5 , 867 2 6 . 9  20 , 454 5 5. 1  
Southern  2 ,450  1 1 . 3  4 ,779  1 2. 9  
Total 20 , 04 2  9 1 . 9 3 5  ,26 0  9 5 . 0  
Other Provinces 1 ,  756 8.1 1 , 871  5 . 0  
Total 2 1 , 7 9 8  1 00.0 3 7 , 1 3 1  1 00 . 0  
Sour c e :  ( 1 )  Northern R hode s ia ,  R eport on the Census of Population of 
Northern R hodesia held on 15th October 1 946 (Lusaka: Government 
Printer, 1 949 ) .  
(Z)  Northern R hodesia, Labour and Mines Department, A nnua l  
Report .for the Year 1 9 5 1  (Lusaka: Gove rnment Printer ,  1 9 52 ) . 
Not e :  Totals wi l l  err by a factor of rounding.
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Under comp any rule and in the early days of the colony, the 
settlers had little formal power; they were mer e ly consulted in the 
making of public  decisions. Later, asserting their rights as Bri.tish 
citi zens and as taxpayer s  in the territory, the settlers  gained representa­
tion through a L egislative Counci l ,  and thereby the abi lity to make their 
views known to government. At  the end of the war ,  the settlers of 
Northern R hodesia j oined the rest of the subje cts of British colonies 
everywhe r e  in gaining a devolution of the powers of self- government 
to the local level. T hey secured the r ight to make the Executive Counci l  
of government r esponsible t o  the settler  majority i n  the Legislative 
Council;  gained " minist e ri a l" control  over several  administrative  
departments in  the  government; and, through what amounted virtua l ly 
- to a parliamentary party, obtained the power to approve appointments 
to posts in charge  of government departments which they thems elves 
did not control. The co lonial  administration thus found itse lf dependent 
upon the s ettlers in the formulation and implementation of public policy. 
The A frican community, by far the more numerous, did not 
receive simi lar  weight in the constitutional structure of the territory. 
Whi le settl e r  representatives entered the Legislative Counci l  in 1 924, 
the first representative of African interests was not appointed unti l  
1 930 ;  and even then, t h e  representative o f  Afric.an opinion was a white
settler and not a black A frican. Whi le  Europeans had participated in 
e lections to the Legislative Council since 1 9 25 ,  A fricans vi r tually 
coul d  not vote until the e lections of 1 95 9 .  The settlers had long had 
the right to organiz e  politically; until after World War II, A frican 
political p arties were  vir tually i l legal in the territory. A nd the 
structures that did exist for registering the views of Africans - - the 
local and provincial  councils - - culminated in an advisory body, the 
African R epresentative Council, rathe r than in an agency vested with 
l l h k' f l ' 1 1actua contro over t e ma mg o po tcy. 
1 3  
T h e  consequences for · the fulfi llment o f  t h e  government's 
protectorate commitment were  predictable. Despite its moral obligation 
and stated commitment to investments off the line of rail, government 
in fact revised and amended its program of public expenditures in favor 
of the line of rai l  communities and the European population that r esided 
therein, Perhaps the most dramatic i llustration of this is in  its 1 95 3  
r evision o f  the Ten�Year D evelopment P lan. A comparison with the 
original program as set out in 1 -947 reveals that while  the absolute 
amount of the cap ital expenditure program incre ased by a fact o r · o f  
four , the amounts aimed a_t the African rural dwel ler  declined. Not 
counting loans to loc al authoritie s ,  the amount unambiguously assigned 
to the rural sector fel l  from £4. 3 6  million to £2.9 million; even counting 
those payment s ,  the rural dwe l ler's unambiguous share of the proposed 
capital expenditures fe l l  from 3 3 , 4  to 1 5 , 4  percent of the total appropria­
tions. 
1 2  
The main reason for the proportionate decline in rural  expendi­
tures  was the vast increase in the planned expenditures upon economic 
inf rastructure for the urban industrial  economy. The expenditures 
for public wor ks and communications · increased by a factor of six and 
inc reased proportionately from slightly less than a quarter to slightly 
' 
more than a third of al l  slated investments. The r elative dec line in 
rural expenditure a lso r esulted from the increase ·in funds for the pro­
vision of social services to urban dwel lers. Thus, there were vast 
increases in spending in African housing - - such expenditures we r e  
made only i n  urban townships and compounds and never i n  t h e  vi l lages; 
s light increase in expenditure on water development; and the app e ar ance 
for the first time of significant exp enditures on public utilities. These 
changes in financial  priorities thus s ignaled a s hift in the commitments 
of the public s e ctor - - a shi ft from a pattern of public expenditures that 
would reduce the disparity in the standards of living brought on by the
patte rn of private investments to a pattern of publi c  investment that 
14 
would comp lement the investments made by private entrepreneurs .  
Like the expenditures o f  p rivate investors , public a llocations now went 
to the area of high e s t  return .  A s  Baldwin s tates :  
" R apid expansion of the e conomy after  the war created p r es s ing 
needs for capital  in the monetary s ector . To take full advantage 
of the s e  new cap ital  opportunities , great ly enlarged outlays on 
r oads , housing,  medical  facilit ie s ,  power ,  water and the l ike,  
were urgently needed, and gave every indication of yie lding 
a higher short run return than s pending on uncertain rur a l  
projects . T h e  government soon s hifted the main part o f  its 
development ·eiforts toward the monetary s e ctor . 11 13 
The role  of the constitutional structure in p rodu cing this con­
c entration of public inves tments along the line of rail  is  s trikingly under ­
lined by the vas t  increase in  funds i n  the one area specifica l ly r e s tr i ct e d  
to Europeans - - t h e  a r e a  o f  European education. Planned expenditure for this 
s ingle item increas ed from £300,000 to £5 . l  million. T he effect of 
the cons titutional order upon the patterns of public  investments is 
again bes t captured by Baldwin: 
"For  years  government officials deplored the extent of this 
imbalance between e conomic development and the monetary 
vers us the subsistence s ector.  But,  under po litical pressur e s  
of t h e  mo ment,  t h e  Legis lative Counci l  invariably responded 
to the wishes  of the European electorate and channeled most  
of the funds available into the money e conomy. Without s igni­
ficant po liti cal  representation, the rural African population,
understandably, was s erious ly neglected. " 14 
The Spe cial  Gase of Agriculture :  
Befo r e  ter minating our dis cuss ion of the co lonial era ,  i t  
would b e  w e l l  t o  dis cuss the p o l i c y . w i t h  t h e  g r e a t e s t  
imp li cation for A frican rur a l  dwe Her s ,  the policy towards agriculture. 
Two aspects of this policy are vital to our dis cussion . For one, the 
policy aimed overwhelmingly at providing s ervi c e s  and facilit ies  to 
the commercial  farmer;  as such, it provided th .e higher rate of 
return to farming a long the line of rail than e lsewhere in Zambia .  
F o r  another, i n  so  far as the policy impinged upon t h e  subsi s tence  
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far mer of f t h e  line of rail  at a l l ,  it  did so in a way that dis couraged 
his emergence as a farmer whos e  rate of return offered a standard of 
living commensurate with what he could obtain in the urban s ector. 
One aspect of this p o licy has already been dis cuss ed: The 
policy toward land, To gain higher returns to agri cultural production, 
and thus prosperity in the rural s ector,  naturally r equir e s  investments 
in agricultur e ;  the s e  can only be made whe r e  the investor is certain 
of his abi lity to recover the r eturn fro m  his outlay. To s e cure farming 
improvements , rights over land mus t  therefore be c learly and enforceably 
vested; and to secure cap ital flows from commer cial  sour c e s ,  r isks to 
c reditors must be minimized by using tit les  s tating the enforceability 
of the s e  r ights. As we have noted, government acted so  as to e s tablish 
the s e  legal  pre- conditions for the capital ization of agricultural  production 
p rimarily a long the line of rail. And i n  so  restricting the extent of its 
legal reforms , government promoted the containment of highly productive 
farming to this region. 
A s imi lar bias was to be found in the provisioning of agricultural 
service s ,  For example ,  the government provided marketing facilities 
in the form of s tatutory boards for the line of rai l provinces ,  but not 
for the r emote areas . The r eason was that marketing s ervices  have 
s ignificant economies of s ca le ,  and so can mos t  e conomically be 
p rovided for the areas of large agriculture produc tion; but the govern­
ment ' s  e conomi c orientation toward the provision of the s e  s ervices  
s erved only to  reinforce ,  not  to  offs et ,  the  disparities in  we l l-being 
1 5  betwe en the central and p e ripheral  areas of the country. Whe r e
government did a c t  as a buyer for t h e  s ma l ler farmers - - primarily 
through the rural marketing s ervice ,  in the areas adjacent to the tine 
of rai l  - - it recovered the cos t of transport  by adjusting prices for 
the distance to the Hne of rai l depots ; by contrast ,  government agencies 
could fo l low a policy of unifor m  pricing for the more c entral ly located 
commercial farme r s .  Once again, the effec t  of government policy was 
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to make the s ma ll-s cale farmer bear directly the costs  associated 
with their l ess  favorable location, rather than to cushion them from 
the s e  costs, and thereby redistribute e conomic r e s ources  to the more  
. 1 6  dis tant areas . 
A s imilar areal  bias existed in the provision of credit and 
extension s ervi ce s .  Commer cial farmer s  o n  the line o f  rail could 
s ecure credi t  from the Land Bank, a s tatutory agency of the govern­
ment, or from commercial sour ces . Both accepted the farmers' 
fixed a s s ets  and titles as s e curity for loans , and therefore wer e  willing 
to accept the r isks  involved in farming inves tments . Natura lly, the 
s ma l l - s cale farmer off of the l ine of rail  could furnish neither kinds 
of s ecurity, and therefore was excluded from using exis ting credit 
facilities. 
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7 The government also provided r es earch  and extension 
facilit i e s ,  but again, concentrated thes e in the central  region of the 
c ountry. T hu s ,  for example,  res ear ch s tations were located in 
Mazabuka,  !v1onze ,  Mount Mukulu, Lus aka, and Salisbury (R hodes ia) 
and inve stigated crop rotations , fertilizer application, pes t  controls , 
and hybr idization; i n  few ins tances ,  however, did they extens ively 
inve stigate the app licability of these  techniques to soi l  typ e s ,  climatic 
conditions , and methods of  production characteris ti c  of  the farming 
areas off the l ine of rail. Even wher e  the results were transferrable 
as with the i mportant innovation of hybrid maize in the mid-501s - - the 
innovations diffused at a much s lower r ate  to the s ma l l - s cale farmer ,  
for the extens ion s taff was concentrated i n  the areas o f  high agricultura l  
production, The bes t  example of this effect i s  in the cas e of beef 
production . The r e s e ar c h  ins titutes conducted extensive work in cross­
breeding beef catt le  for commercial production, atte mpting to  introduce  
into imported breeds the  res is tence to  local dis eas e s  developed in 
indigenous stock.  Important progres s  was made in developing new 
cattle typ e s ,  but the benefits of this innovation wer e  overwhelmingly . 
captured  by the commercial far mers; for the Department of Veterinary 
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S ervices confined its activities to the centers of commer cial  farmin g .  
A s  Dresang conclude s ,  "Governmental efforts t o  increase agricultura l  
production did not extend beyond the Eur op ean community. 11 1 8
The gove rnment thus maintained agencies and s ervices  
designed to increase  productivity of agriculture and thereby increase  
rural  income s ,  but  confined thes e  to  a narrowly defined s ector: the 
s e c tor where output was already high, where  the costs of p roduction 
were r elative"ly low, and ·where s ignificant capital had already been 
invested by p rivate individuals . F ew of these efforts by government 
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did much to increas e the levels of income of the rural dweller s .  
There is  one las t s ignificant aspect o f  government policy that 
des erves note , and this is the area of price policy. This policy can 
best be dis cus s ed in terms of one of the major local crop s ,  maiz e .  
T h e  main purpos e o f  t h e  government price poHcy w a s  to maintain a 
cheap and abundant s upply of food to the urban consumer .  Government 
performed this function by subsidizing the marketing agencies for 
differ entials between the earnings they realized in s e l ling maize  at  
the low consumer price and the expenses  they incurred in purc hasing 
the product from farmers . In the post- war period, when the govern­
ment was committed to a p o licy of agricultural development, the 
marketing agencies encouraged prodtic tion by maintaining high p roducer  
prices ;  the  result was a consis tent trend of oversupply for the local 
market,  and a continuing los s by th-, marketing agencies as they s old 
the surplus production on the r elatively dep r e s s ed wor ld market.  '.The 
government offs et this los s with public funds , and the resultant subsidy 
to the farmer has been e s timated at approximate ly £2.  5 mi llion over 
the period 1 955 to 195 7 .  20 The effe ct of this policy, however ,  did not
extend beyond the conuner cial farming s ector, For the vas t majority 
of  African far m  fami lies lived in regions not s erviced by the s tatutor y
marketing agencies that benefited from the government ' s  expenditures . 
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The more rerrd;.e farm families faced an entirely different pricing 
policy. Rather than being subject to a policy whose main purpose was 
to encourage maximum production, even at the cost of expensive sur­
pluses, they faced a policy whose goal was to generate regional self­
sufficiency in production. The _ _ scale of provincial production was such 
that private entrepreneurs· would not furnish transport and marketing 
facilities, nor, as we have seen, was government itself willing to 
absorb the cost of marketing, either by "exporting" produce from the more 
remote farms to the line of rail or by "importing" produce to these 
regions should local production fail to meet local demand. The govern­
ment therefore set prices at a level designed to make each remote 
region self-sufficient in food. The result was that as local farmers 
became more productive and thereby generated a surpl_us, the govern­
ment reduced the price offered to local producers. Local producers 
were penalized, rather than rewarded, for increasing output. They 
therefore had little incentive to invest in increased production in 
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agriculture. 
The primary effect of this price policy was to place a limit 
on the increase of rural earnings through the increase of agricultural 
production. An important secondary effect was to prevent regional 
specialization and the realization of gains from trade to be got through 
comparative advantage. By emphasizing self-sufficiency, rather than 
"export," as a goal of pricing policy in the more remote regions of Zambia , 
the government therefore perhaps discouraged the concentration of investments 
in the production of crops which could most efficiently be grown. And 
it prevented the realization of the income effects that could be gained 
had persons been able to purchase products which were being grown 
in the areas where they could most cheaply be produced. The effect 
of the po !icy was, p erhaps, both to make goods more expensive to the 
rural consumer than they need have been, and to keep his level of 
output below what could have been. The off-the-line-of-rail farming 
fatnilies were therefore placed at a grave disadvantage. 
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Evidence for the consequence of the surge of industrialization 
along the line of rail and of the retardation of the development of small­
s ca le farming in the colonial period is to be found in the estimates of 
income for the early 1 96 0's . For example, the government in its Draft 
Development Plan of 1 96 2  noted that "in 1 960 ,  the total production for 
cash sale of the 400 ,000  African farming families in the rural areas 
was less than £ 2  million, that is less th;rn £5 per farming family. 
This production would have been much smaller but for the production 
of the peasant and improved farmers, some of whom were able to 
earn as much as £150 to £200 in cash income from the sale of their 
2 2  . .crops.  By contrast, the average urban wage earner was receiving 
approximately £1 00, and the mineworkers were earning approximately 
£ 2 5 0  a year in 1 96 0 .  The natural result of this differential was that 
many persons left the villages for the more remunerative cities. By 
1955, it is estimated, over 11._4 percent of Zambia's A frican popu­
lation had moved to the urban areas along the line of rail, making 
Zambia the third most urbanized of the black nations of Africa. And 
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by the 1 96 0 ' s ,  over 20 percent resided in these urban centers. The 
trend toward the line of rail was firmly in motion by the time of 
independence in Zambia. 
Toward the End of the Colonial Era: 
The primary reason for leaving the rural areas, we have 
argued, was to be better off. But not everyone could make the ms elves 
better off th rough the market for labor. For many - - those too old, 
those too young, and the women -- migration was an unattractive 
alternative. For others, income was but one of the things they sought 
from life; attachment to friends, refatives, and village life were also 
important, an_d so the alternative of migration was not chosen. In 
neither case did the rejection of migration mean a lack of interest in 
greater well-being; rather it simply meant that fulfilling the urban 
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demand for labor was not a viable means of becoming better off. Many 
rural dwel lers turned to ·other a lternatives as a way of improving their 
condition . One of the alternatives was politi c s . 24
A s  is  well known, African politics in  Z ambia, as  with 
Afri can politics elsewhere, was largely urban in origin . The major 
i s s ue of the nationalis t movement was the racial  i s s ue; and thi s  was 
s imply mos t  relevant to urban. dwellers .  Urban African s  took recourse 
to po litics  to counter racial  bias es that had been introduced by Europeans 
into the urban marketplace. The major s uch bia s ,  of cours e ,  was 
" the color bar" in the urban labor markets by which European unions 
compel led employers to artHi cial ly lower the returns .  to A frican 
labor;  they did s o  by excluding A frican workers from the more preferred 
categories of indus trial employment. Some of the more exp losive moments 
in the ear ly his tory of African politics in Z ambia arose over this is s ue 
25 and are t reater! at length e lsewhere. Simi lar patterns characterized
the consumer market. For European consume r s ,  through legis lation 
and socia l pressure, excluded A fricans from large s ectors  of the com­
mercial trade; and thi s ,  in turn, provoked a further series of demonstra­
tions and boycotts that sparked the nationalist  drive in the 1 930 ' s .  2 6
The central  purpose of the nationalist  movement, however ,  was 
not so much to alter the allocations made through .economic markets ,  
but rather to  alter the dis tribution of public  goods by  government . T he 
provision of public goods was radically biased in favor of the Europeans . 
The government provided secondary s chools and hos pitals for res ident 
European s , for example ,  that compared f.;_vorably with tho s e  throughout 
the wor ld .  27 But for African s , there was but a single secondary s chool
that offered pre-univers ity training ,  and the quality of medical care 
ava i lable to the average African was well  below that which . the average
European could expect to receive . The European population, of  cours e ,  
reaped the benefits created by thes e  services , b e  i t  i n  te rms o f  qual ifications 
for better jobs and higher earnings or in terms of sheer life expectancy. 
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It was the anger of the Africans at having been excluded from these 
benefits that gave the major impetus to the formation of political 
organizations . The demands of the nationalis t s  therefore focused 
on founding the constitutional s tructure which would ves t  contro l 
over the allocation· of public s ervices in the hands of the A frican 
majority. And the history of the progres s in African politics  i s  
marked b y  the ser ies o f  constitutional revisions that increas ing ly 
secured the transfer of public power to African hands . 
2 8  
B e  the i s s ue job dis crimination, consumer boycot t s ,  health 
care, or education, the very fact that the s ignificant ·private markets 
exi s ted on the line of rail ,  and that the majority of public facilities 
were based there, was s ufficient reas on to insure that the national i s t  
movement concentrated i t s  efforts in  that region. ·Nonetheles s ,  
the centra l  i ssue - - that of racial  dis crimination - - was an i s s ue 
that could lead to a coa lition of a l l  Africans , and the rural dwellers  
we·re  able to  align behind it . They had many reasons for doing so ;  
and strong ly among· them was thei r  des ire to protect and increase 
their level. of well -being . 
This desire was r efle cted in one of the primary fears that 
motivated opposi tion to colonia l  r ule in the rural sector; fear of the 
further alienation of land to European settler s .  The transformation 
of conditions of tenure a long the line of rail had led to the termination 
of native rights to land in that area,  and the wholes ale exclusion of 
dghts of s ettlement in what had formerly been A frican territory. 
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On a far smaller s cale ,  similar a lienations of land took p laae in 
the outlying regions of Z ambia,  if only for the formation of mis s ion
s tations or fo r the ·es tabl ishment of trading areas  in .  the boma town-
ship s .  
3 0  As noted by s tudents of nationalist  his tory, the fear of
furthe r  trans fers of the major economic a s s et of the African com-
munity cons tituted a major bas is  for the oppos ition to co lonial govern­
ment .  Knowledge of the extent of land alienation in other white- dominated 
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nations gave credibility to thes e fears,  and the nationalist  organizers 
wer e  quick to make us e of them. 
Equal ly i mportant was the opposition to taxe s .  Taxes every­
where have sparked p olitical  protest ;  and, given the record of  his tory, 
it s hould caus e no wonder that oppos i tion to taxes should have been a 
fundamental basis  for the overthrow of the co lonial regime. A s  Crane 
Brinton write s  in his s tudy of the great revolutions of Western Europe,  
"I t  i s  interesting to note . .  , that they .al l had in common a financial 
origin, all began as  protests  against taxation. 1131 In Zambia, this
als o was the case .  In part, the protes ts again s t  taxation wer e  direct ly 
that; one of the culminating acts of the nationalis t  rebellion was the 
burning of the hated fitupas, the tax booklets in which an African's 
tax payments were  receipted, and without which he was liable  to 
arrest. Mor e generally ,  howeve r,  the protes ts took the for m of 
res i stence to local  native authorities,  which s erved as the taxing 
agency in the rural areas,  As the native authorities  re tained a 
por tion of the tax receipts which they collected,  and as they could, 
with gover nment permis sion impose new taxes ,  they exa·cted reve -
. 3 2  Th nues from the rural  res idents with considerable vigor . ey
enforced the capitation taxes on a l l  working age male s .  They 
charged l lcense fees for almost every conceivable sour ce o.f rural 
cash income: hunting, fi shing, s tore owning, produce .  marketing, 
and so forth . T hey fined persons engaged in profitable enterpri s e s ,  
such as beer brewing . A n d  through the powe r to fine, they com­
pel led expenditures  that mos t  pers ons would voluntari ly not have 
under taken - - expenditures on the fines thems e lves of cours e, and 
further expenditures,  if only in·time and effort, to correct 
the penalized a ctivity, be it  fai ling to cons truct houses  up to 
s tatutory s tandards,  to instal l  lega l ly required s anitation facilities ,  
or  to  prepare prop e r  drainage in vi l lage areas . 
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T he s e  taxes and fines rep1·es ented a cons iderable drain on 
the resources of the rural dwel lers . In 1 9 38, for example, the 
average rural  cap itation tax was 7 I 6d. , and the best e s timates  of
the average subsistence income per  capita for that year is  in  the 
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area of £4, Thus,  1 0  percent o f  the total earnings wer e  taxed, 
which of cours e r epres ents a much higher percentage earnings of 
the cash earnings of the rural dwel ler ,  When the magnitude 'of  the 
licens es and fines are included, the diversion of fis cal  resources 
from the rur a l  dwe llers  .to government assumes even greater magni­
tude .  In  the  eyes of  many rural dwel lers,  the  primary s ervices  
returned - - law and order  under foreign ru le  -- did not fai r ly 
compensate for their loss of wel l -being. They fe lt wors e  off. And 
so they allied with the urban sour ces of nationalism and organized in 
oppos ition to the local native authorities and to the alien government. 
The rural rebellion was thus in large part a quest  for a higher 
leve l of well-being - - a level of wel l- being that many could not s e ­
cur e  i n  the labor mar ket and that mos t  would prefor n o t  t o  have to 
s ecure by s upplying their  labor to u rban indus try. 
III 
THE POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD 
The Ur ban Alternative : Industrial  Inves tment in the Post-
Independence Period: 
There is no reason to go into the intricate s e ries of moves 
that led to the transfe r  of power to the hands of the African majority 
Suffice it to s ay that in· O ctober of 1 964 Zambia became an ind ep e ndent 
state , and that it  was r.uled by UNIP, a party which gained governmental 
power by succes s fully competing for votes against other parti e s  und e r  
34  conditions of univers a l  adult suffr age ,  In  the  pre-independence
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e lections , UNIP r eceived 6 9 . l  perce.nt of the votes cast. Its mandate 
was from both urban and rur a l  cons tituencies.  It won all of 
the urban· e lector a l  dis tricts. fut the nature of the dis.tribution of 
s eats under the conditions of univer s al s uffrage was s uch that of 
the 55 s eats which UNIP h e ld in parliament, 41 were  from the rura l  
areas , The s hift in the locus of e lectoral  power to the Africans ,  and 
to the rur a l  s ector ,  was th us comp lete . 
R ur a l  
TA BLE 4 
1 964  E l e ction R e s ults 
:tv1ain R ol l  
UKIP 
Urban Rural  
ANG TOTA L 
Urban 
Contested 1 9 1 2 1 0  0 41 
Uncont.e s ted 22  2 0 0 2 4  
Total 4 1  1 4  1 0 0 6 5  
Sourc.e : Parliamentary E l e ctions Office ,  "Analyst of Polling, Northern 
Rhodesia  Gene ral Election 1 964," Mimeo. 2.8 January 1 964.  
Note: Distri cts counted as urban are thos e in the ten major urban center s  
in the copperbelt  and o n  the line o f  rai l ,  p lus immediately adj acent 
peri-urban districts (e . g. , Kafiro -nda, Ndola West) .  
·while the demands of the constituents of the governing party
wer e  many and various , they coincided unanimous ly at one point: that 
the African majority was to utilize its newly attained hegemony in 
the .public sec tor to make itse lf better off, The government therefo r e  
committed itself t o  a program o f  r apid economic deve lopment through 
inv e s tments in the formation of domestic industry. 
The new government was in a position to make such invcs t-
1nents on an unprecedented s cale. For at the time of independence , 
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the quantity of capital funds avai lable to the s tate burg eoned dramatical ly. 
Funds that had hitherto gone to the federal  government reverted to Zambia 
when it attained the s tatus of an independent po litical  authority. More­
over ,  w�th independence ,  the Z a1nbian government renegotiated to its 
benefit the royalties  agreement with the Bril:lsn South African Company 
and so imp ro>·ed publi c  acce s s  to the wealth that was ·generated by the 
. . . 3 5  rrun1ng companies .  Lastly, the time o f  independence coincided with. 
a favorable and major upswing in the international price of copper;  
having s tood at £2.30 per  ton of e le ctrolytic wirebar on the London 
Meta l Exchange at the year before independence,  the price of copper  
doubled in the following yea r .  The result was a surge in  government 
revenues from company taxes ·and mineral royalties , p lus new earnings 
from ·an " export tax" which government i mposed to capture the windfall 
res ulting from the soaring price of copper .  
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A l l  to ld, in the fir s t  
fi s ca l  year o f  independence ( 1 9 64 - 1 96 5 ), the government was able to 
lay c laim to an estimated K 84,422 ,000  in recurrent r evenues ,  a figure  
which repres ented an  increase  of over 3 0 0  percent from the actual. 
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revenues of the last fi s ca l  year p r io r  to independenc e .  
TABLE 5 
Copper P rice:  Annual London Metal Exchange Mean Cash Price per  
Tonne of  Electro lytic Wire Bars 
Year 
1 96 2  -
1 96 3  -
1 96 4  -
1 965 -
1 966 -
1 96 7  -
1 968  -
1 96 9  -
1 970 -
1 971 -
.f. 
- 2.3 0  
- - - 23 0  
- - -346 
- - -464 
- 5 41 
- - 41 1
- - 5 1 7  
- - 6 1 1  
- 5 89 
- - - 444 
Source: Mindeco, Mindeco Mining Ye ar Book 1971 ( I<itwe: Copper 
!11rl11stry Service Bu rea11, fl, d,). 
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In pursuing rapid industrial growth, the government devoted 
an average of 6 0  p e rcent of its annuai expenditures  to the formation 
of capital .  
T A B LE 6 
C entral Government ExEenditures 1 969/65 to1 96 9  
(Millions o f  Kwacha) 
1964/65 1 96 5 / 6 6  1 966/6 7 1967  1 968 1 96 9  
Current Spending 1 0 1 .4 1 2 3 .  9 1 62 . 5  1 02 . 0  2 1 6 .4  2 2 3,2 
A s  percent total 7 8 . 5  6 6 . 4  6 4 . 5  6 1 . 3  5 3 . 3  6 0 . 8  
Capital Spending 2 7 .  7 6 2 .  7 8 9 . 5  6 4 . 5  1 89.8  . 1 44 . 2  
A s  percent total 2 1 . 5 3 3 . 6  3 5 . 5  3 8 .  7 46 . 7 3 9.2 
129 .  l 1 86 . 6  252.0 1 66 . 5  406, 2 3 6 7.4  
Source: Char les Harvey, "The Control of Inflation in a Very Open Economy: 
Zambia 1 964-61, 11 Eastern A frican Economic Review, Vol .  3 ,  No. 1 
(June 1 97 1 ) ,  p .  44 .. 
T he r ate of private investment, while not matching that of the 
public s ector, nonetheles s was also high; for, as can be s e en 
in Table Seven, the national level of gro s s . fixed capital_ for mation
by public and private investor s  remained at roughly 20  per cent
of the gross national product over the s ame time period .
Gro s s  Fixed 
TABLE 7 
Gross  Fixed Capital Formation as Percent of 
Gross  Natural Product, at 1 96 5  Market Prices 
1 96 4  1 965  1 96 6  1 96 7  1 96 8  
A mount % A mount % A mount % Amount % A mount 
Km. Km. Km. Km. Km. 
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i 969  
% A mount % 
Km. 
Capital Formations 8 2 . 7  1 5 . 0 1 20.4 1 8.5  1 6 3. 7  2 2. 2  1 78.4 2 3.0 200 . 1  24.5 1 8 1 . 0 1 8. 2  
Gros s  Natural 
6 8 2. 8
1 7 26.1 1 768 .  7 1 9 5 1 .0
1 Product 477.3 6 0 4.4 
Source :  Central Statis tical  Office ,  Monthly Digest of Statis tics ,  Vol .  8 ,  No.  6 
(Lusaka: CSO ,  June,  1 9 72). 
Note: Adjusted for changes in the terms of trade. 
The magnitude of investments was therefore unp'recedented ly 
high in pos t-independence Zambia; the pattern was roughly what would 
be expected ,  given the structure of the Zambian economy. Most were 
in enterpris e s  which sold their output principally to the mining industry. 
Many of the s e  were by way of import substitution. Ba ldwin, writing 
of the miCl-1 9 5 0's , s tate s :  "Of the main supplies used for operational 
purpos e s  in the copper mines - - explo s ives ,  timber, coal ,  furnace 
and firebrick s ,  mi l l  balls (us ed  to crush ore ) ,  rai ls and fittings ,  and 
steel -- about 15 percent of the timber is cut within the territory, and 
a large s hare of the mi l l  balls are manufactured in Northern Rhodes ia .  
The rest  of  the arti c les  are imported. 11
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This lis t  predicts s trongly
most of the n1ajor investments in the post- independence period. For, 
among the major achi evements of the first planning period ( 1 9 66 - 1 9 7 1 )  
were the construction of the nitrates and exp losives industry which 
sold most of its produce to the t'nines ; the development of major
local deposits of coal, almost a ll of which is consumed on refining 
and smelting operation s ;  and the creation of a clay products p lant 
in the manufacturing of clay pipes and firebri c ks ,  most of which 
again are consumed by the mines .  
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In addition, the metal working 
group of industries ,  which p roduced the mill balls , fittings,  rai ls , 
etc .  grew rapidly over this per iod. A s  s tated in a r eview of the 
first  planning period: 
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" T he total number  o f  industrial establishments increased . . 
[by] 3 0  percent . The largest  among existing i ndustrial units 
belong<;< to the metal working group -- large ly subs e rving the 
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mining industry and economic activities connected therewith . " 
So too, the cement industry, which expanded its capacity by · 80 per cent 
principal ly by creating a new p lant on the Gopperbelt its e lf; and the 
cons truction industry, which in 1 96 5  received mor e  payments from 
the mines than any other domestic industrial s e ctor ,  nearly tripled 
its capacity ove r  the fir st  p lanning period . Nearly comp l eted at the 
end of the first  p lanning period was a new oil r efinery, which would 
s el l  much of its output to the mine s .  The creation of industr ies  that 
transferred the profits ass ociated with provis ioning the mines to 
the domestic e conomy thus characterized the major pattern of invest­
ments in the pos t-independence period. 
In many of thes e  projects , the government played the part of 
an entrepreneur.  For example,  through its Indeco group of indus tri e s ,  
i t  was a founding and major s hareholder in the nitrate s and explos ives 
indus try, the cement industry, and the c lay and fir ebrick factories .  
Noneth e l e s :i ,  dir ect investment by government was but a minor p art 
of the ove rall level of public investment at this time . Dres ang
indicate s that from the time of independence to 1 96 7, only 1 9  percent 
of the government ' s  capital expenditure was in the form of direct 
• 
4 1  
d h I inves tments;  an , for tnc fis cal year 1 970 ,  despite t e government s 
increased holding in enterprises as the result of the 1 96 9  economic 
reforms , di rcct investments by government rcpres entccl only 1 4 .  7 
2 9  
percent o f  its capital p rogram. 
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Much more s ignificant were  the 
government ' s  expenditures on economi c infrastructure ,  which  were 
designed to underpin a high rate of return on p r ivate capital  formation 
and thus produce fur ther inves tments by private entrepreneurs .  For 
example,  the government made major capital outlays to modernize 
and upgrade the equipment of. the national railways . It facilitated 
the purchas e of s upplies and equipment abroad by creating a trans ­
port  fleet and depot facilities  for trade with the coast ,  r e surfacing 
the road s ys t e m  to the coas tal ports ,  and expanding the harbor and 
warehous e facilities  in the port areas � It expanded the energy supply 
available to  indus try by laying an oil pipe line to the coast ,  and by 
investing in major increas e s  in the s upply of hydroelectric  power .  
By Dres ang ' s  e stimate s ,  between 1964 and 1969,  5 5  percent of the 
government ' s  capital expenditure  went to the formation of infra­
s tructu re of this kind. 43 
Both t !1e magnitude and pattern of the s e  inves tments by
private enterprise  and by government had major cons equences for 
Zambia.  The magnitude led to enormous increases  in the domestic 
product of Zambia, which grew from approximately K 465 mil lion 
in 1964 to near ly K 1 bi llion in 196 9 .  The p attern, however ,  
insured that while the economy underwent a revolutionary trans ­
formation in i t s  s ize , it did not alter s ignificantly in its s tructure .  
As s e en in  T a b l e  8, o.ne of the  mos t  str iking features  of e conomic
growth in pos t - independence Zambia was the radica l ly greater 
magnitude an(! the s eeming ly unchanged dis tribution of the origins 
of the domes tic product.
TA BLE 8 
Industrial Origin of the Gros s Domes tic  Product  
At  Factor Cost  
(K Million and Percent) 
1 964 
Sector A mt. % A mt.  
A griculture,  Forestry, Fishing 5 3 . 3  11 .5  6 7 . 0  
a .  Commer cial Farming 1 7 . 0  3 . 7  16. 7 
b. Other Farming, Fores try, Fishing 3 6 . 3 7 . 8  5 0 . 3  
Mining & Quarrying 2 20 . 8 47 . 5  405 .4  
Manufacturing 2 8 . 2  6 . 1 7 3 . 6  
Construction 2 0 . 0  4. 3 5 5 . 2  
Electricity & Water 5 . 0  1 . 1  14 .6  
Trade 4 5 . 8  9 . 8  1 0 2.4  
Fis cal Institutions & Insurance 0 .6  0 .1  35 .4  
R eal Es tate 10.6  2. 3 2 9 . 5  
Transport & Communication 20 .6  4 .4 65 . 2 
Government Administration 2 1 . 2  4.6 45 . 8  
Community & Busines s  Services 1 9 .6 4. 2 68 . 1 
Pers onal Services 19 .6  4. i 28, l 
Gros s Domestic  Product at Factor Cos t 465 . 3  100 . 1 990.3  
3(> 
1 9 6 9  
% 
6 . 8  
1 .  7 
5 . 1  
4 0 . 9  
7 .4 
5 � 6  
1 . 5  
1 0 . 3  
3 . 6  
3 .0 
6 . 6  
4,6 
6 . 9  
2 , 8  
.1 0 0 . 0  
Source: M inis try of -Finance,  E conomic R eport 1 97 1  ( Lus aka Gover nment
Printer ,  January 1972), pp. 58, 60 - 6 1 .  
A s econd major cons equence of the high leve l of investments.
was an increase in the leve l of wages .  (Table 9 )  
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The rate of capital formation insured rapid increases in 
the productivity of labor, which  would naturally produce increased 
3 2  
wages • The s ole exception to t he trend of productivity increases  
. took place  in  1 96 6 ,  and resulte d fro m the disrui;tim in Zambi a ' s  e conomy 
occasioned by the disarray in transport s ervices when Rhodesia rebelled
against Great Britain. At that time, average wages ros e  anyway, 
even while productivity fell. This points to a s e cond major reason 
for wage increases in the post - independence period :  the power of 
organized  labor in Zambia.  With the coming of independence  and 
the expectation of enhanced wel l - being as s o ciated with that event, 
the African working force effected a redistribution of income to wag e s .  
A nd the newly created African government, s ensitive to t h e  demands 
of its cons tituents that they be made better off, permitte d  the transfer. 
Independence brought a las t  major reason for the increased earnings :  
the imp lementation of programs of African advancement. With inde ­
p endence came the opportunity for Africans to use  public power to 
intervene in private indus try s o  as to modify hiring, training ,  and 
p romotional practices . The government, through Z ambianization 
committee s ,  tax allowances for training programs , expenditures in 
education , and its control of the board of directors in s tate industries ,  
achieved an upgrading of the African labor force - - an upgrading that 
is reflected, in part, in increased rates  of p ay .  For a l l  the s e  reasons , 
the average earnings of African working men increased appreciably in 
h f . d d 44 t e year a ter in epen ence.  
If  the magnitude of the investments helped to create greater
output and higher wages ,  the pattern of the investments helped to con-
fi ne  the s e  increases to the line of rail. As we have s een, private entre ­
preneurs  s eeking highest  r eturns and the government s eeking rapid 
industrial growth -- both invested heavily in s ectors which s erviced the 
mining industry or which catered to the demand created by that industry. 
Natur ally, the s e  investments concentrated in the urban are as . Th.e result 
L uapala 
N orther n  
Eastern 
Southern 
Central 
C opper belt  
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was that of the  532  industrial manufacturing establishments that exis ted 
in 1 96 9 ,  a full 5 24 or 9 8 . 5  percent were in the line of rail  provinces. 45
The pattern of inves tment also insured that emp loyment opportunities 
concentrated on the line of rail ,  and that the increase in wages which 
resulted from the high rates of capital  formation benefited primarily 
the line of rail dwellers . Thu s ,  as Table 1 0  suggests , the Central, 
Southe.rn ,  and Copper b e lt Provinces , which in 1 96 9  had just under 50 
percent of the population, had over 80 percent of the jobs in 1 96 8 .  And,  
whereas the average annual private s ector wage in the Copper belt- in 
1 96 8  was K 954 in money terms , the comparable wage in,  s ay, Luapula 
Province was K 641 .  
TA BLE 1 0  
African Employment and Earnings, Regional Dis tribution 
1 
Employment Population Percent Average Africa� 
Population Annual Money 
1 966 1 96 9  1 96 9  Employed Earnings 
Public Private 
Total !}0 T otal % Total % % Sector Sector 
5 , 9 2 0  1 . 9 6 ,  7 1 0 2 . 0  3 36 , 00 0  8 . 3  2 . 1  654 641 
1 2 ,470 4. 2 1 8 ,070  5 .5  5 45 , 000  1 3 . 4  2 . 4  422 485  
1 1 , 6 5 0  3 . 9  1 3 , 5 3 0  4 . 1  5 1 0 ,000  1 2. 6  2 . 6  7 1 7  2 6 2  
3 6 , 740 1 2. 2  3 3, 3 1 0  1 .0. 3 496 ,000  1 2 . 2 6 . 7  482  535  
8 6 , 820  28 .6  9 7,970  29 . 8  7 1 3 ,000  17  . 6  1 1 . 6  7 5 2  7 5 4  
1 3 5 , 574 44. 8 1 44,040 4 3 . 9  8 1 6 ,000  20 . 1  1 5 . 4  7 5 7  9 5 4  
North-wes tern 5 , 0 3 0  1 . 6 5 ,420 1 . 6 232 ,000  5 . 7  2 . 6  444 2 9 1  
Wes tern 8 ,560  2 . 8  9 , 2 5 0  2 . 8  4 1 0 ,000  1 0 . 1  2 . 3  5 2 2  3 9 2  
T otal 3 1 2, 764 1 00 . 0  328 , 3 0 0  1 00 .00  4, 0 5 8 , 0 0 0  1 0 0 . 0 
Source:  ( l )  Republic of Zambia,  Minis try of Development Planning and -National Guidance ,  
Second National Deve lopment Plan1 January 1 9,2  - December 1 976 (Lus aka: 
Gove rnment Printer ,  1 97 1 ) ,  p.  1 72 .  
( 2 )  R epublic o f  Zambia, Emeloyment and Ea rnings1 1 96 6 - 6 8  (Lus aka, Central
Statis t ical Office 1 970 ) ,  pp ._1 7 - 28 ,  4 5 .  
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T his pattern, a s  i l lustrated in Table 1 0, i s  p recis e ly what 
existed in the pre - independence period, and once again under lines 
the extent to which  the e conomy has been transforrred in magnitude, 
but not in  structure ,  by the new A fr ican government. 
The Rur a l  A lternative: Public Policy in the Rural Sector : 
We have argued that p ro to - mi grants respond to differ entials  
in earning s .  It  is  the r efo r e  important to note that contemporaneous l y  
with the move towar d  industrialization, extensive investments were  
also made off the  line of  rai l ,  in  the  rural  s e ctor of Zambia .  In 
almost no cas e wer e  thes e investments made by pr ivate entrepre neu r s .  
The returns to investments i n  the burgeoning industrial center were 
such that private entrepreneurs  had little incentive for rural invest­
ments . Indeed, as in the . cas e of some corrunercial farmers and 
rural busines s men, private capita l often left the rural sector in 
the years after independence.  Rather, the active financial agent 
was government, which had reasons for p lacing a higher priority 
on the rural investments than wou ld be warranted s o le ly by their  
economic return s .  For one , the ideo logy of  the government, entitled 
"Humanis.m,"  stres sed equality of access to the benefits and opportunities  
to be cr eated by governmental action. As a doctrine , Humanism 
stressed  the equality of man: the dignity and worth of even the mos t  
impoverished indivi dual;  and the mora l  s uperiority o f  the vi l lage 
which, though poor, noneth e le s s  fos tered a respect for man and p r e ­
s erved social /-.armony and mutual inte r -dependence - - the principal 
virtues exto lled by the doctr ine 1 s p ropounder, Pres ident Kaunda.  
As the Pres ident once stated: 
"Government is vita lly inter ested in participating actively in the 
economic l ife of  the country. But . . .  ALL OUR PEOPLE MUST 
BE DR OUGHT INTO THIS . . .  , How can it be done? To be 
effective we must think in ter ms of the smallest unit . . .  the vi l lage .  
, . .  I must admit that I hesi tate to interfe r e  to  any gr eat extent 
with vi l lage life as it is today for the very reason that cultura l ly we 
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may be committing s uicide - - we might . • •  without being aware 
of i t ,  des troy some of the best  things in our national culture . A t  
the same time, t o  leave our vil lages as they are today means 
s tagnation and the last  may w e ll be worse than the firs t. "46 
The government a lso  had s tron g  political incentive s for 
making rural exp e nditures .  A high percentage of  the electorate and 
of  the party cadres were from that s ector and man y  had made heavy
p ersonal investments -- in terms of time, pain,  and opportunities 
foregone -- to put an  A frican governmen t  in power. The government, 
in time, would be accountable to that electorate,  and this poli tica l 
�otive insured the rural areas the financial attentions of the public 
s ector. 
A last and major reason for the governme n t ' s  investments 
was the growing realization toward the end of the 1 96 0 1 s and in the early 
1 97 0 ' s  that its poli cy of rapid i ndustrialization was not  going to be 
succe s s ful ly ful fi l led without the increased production of agricultural 
goods , The lag in the rura l sector threatened to produce s carcities of 
food.  And  this in turn threatened to dep lete foreign reserves through 
the importation of agricultural products and to reduce the profits of 
industry as a result of wage dema nds keyed to consumer  prices. Both 
cons iderations furnished incentives to governmen t  to attempt to make 
agricultural p roducts more abundant.  
A.  The Initia l Commitment:  
Zambia became independent on October 24,  1 964 .  The first 
o ccasion at which the leaders of the new governme n t  publ ic ly met the
UNIP worke r s  that placed them in  power was at a public meeting in
Chi fubu on the 1 7th of January, 1 96 5 .  The principa l  theme of the 
m e e t i n g  was the extent of the sacrifices that all s ections of Znmbia
nrns t  make in the eco nomic cons truction of the new n ation ;  a secondary,
but i mportant ,  topic was the benefits that independence would bring to 
Y ear 
1 %4 
1 96 5  
1 966  
1 96 7  
. 1 96 8  
a l l  dwel lers o f  Zambia.  A s  related by one observer: 
"The Northern News reported on 18 January that 'The President 
called on  al l  the unemployed i n  Zambia to form themselves into 
cooperative s ocieties  and to put their various s kills to work on 
the agricultural and cons truction projects planned; 1 President 
Kaunda declared :  'The mon e y  is there and the know-how is 
there . You can form the s e  cooperative societie s0 any.where in
Zambia and  we s hall  as s i s t  you in  getting on. 1 1 1 47
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T h e  mes s age rapidly pas s e d  down through the party s tructure 
and out into the villages. At a rate and magnitude that n e arly over­
whelmed the adminis trative capabilities of the new government, loc a l  
party units organized thems elves and their fellow villagers into pro­
ductive units ,  be they cons truction gangs ,  bri ck make r s ,  or farmers . 
They demanded certificates of regis tration, loans to acquire initial 
stocks of implements and supplies ,  and training and extensio n  s ervic e s .  
Two thousand  app lications for regis tra tion were received in  the firs t 
five months of 1 96 5 ,  as compared with five for all of 1 964 .  48 Within
the year the number of regis tered coop eratives in Zambia more than 
doubled; and within two years , the nu.mber had doubled again. 
TA BLE 1 1
Total N urr1ber Total Regis tered Total Dis s olved T otal 
of Societies Societies Societies M e mbership 
2 20 8 9 4 3 , 6 9 7  
468  264 1 6  4 9 , 7 2 4  
6 0 1  1 3 5  2 4 4 , 2 8 :>  
8 7 5  2 79 5 5 2 , 6 3 7  
1 , 069 1 95 5 2 , 664  
Source :  Adapted from Republic  of Zambia, Department of C o - operatives ,  
Annua.l Reoort for the Year l 'J 6 8  ( Lus aka:  Government Printer ,
1·96 9 ,  p .  7 ) .  
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The rural ar eas , whic h  had fai led to attract capital  investments 
from the p r ivate market or frorn the colonial regime , now s ought to 
offs et  their pos i tion  of  r e lative dis advantage through the us e of polit ical  
channe ls . T he government, which  they had p laced in power , offered 
to back their  efforts  in  productive enterp r i s e s ;  they a ccepted the 
. . t 
49 
offer and h e ld the government to its comm1tmen . 
Some of the investments elicited by the cooperative societies 
were purely financial .  For examp le ,  the  gove rnment offered to  
compens ate regi s tered  societies for  c lear ing and s tumping new land, 
the reby b r inging new acreage into production. Within the fir s t  few 
5 0year s ,  t h e  coop e ratives had gained 1 . 2 mi l lion kwacha i n  this manner ,  
However ,  by far the most  important invest ments which  they attained 
were in new pu'oli c servi ces . A ccess  to thes e  s e rvic e s  was not res tric ted 
to the coope rative s ocieties ;  they were avai lable to a l l  rural dwel lers . 
At the init iati\"e of the cooperativ e s ,  much of rur a l  Zambia was therefore 
p rovided witb. s e n·ices  for the firs t  t ime . 
The basic  idea behind the new s e rvices was to perform 
functions that , under · the circµmstance s ,  the p rivate market could 
not perfo r m .  O n e  s u c h  function was the provision o f  funds for agr i ­
cultural inves tment. A nothe r was the virtual creation of a market:  
a mechanism for the bringing o f  the urban demand for agricu ltural 
produce to the vi l lage level and the supp lying of the rural demand for 
:< g r icultural « C'quis i tes  from urban sour ce s .  In ins ti tutiona l form, 
t h e s e  s ervices took the for m  of a rural credit or ganization and a 
marketing agency. To underpin its commitment to enhance the income 
oi the rural sector ,  the gove rnnient, under intense political pres s ur e ,  
S C't out t o  create both ins titutions .
The  C redit  O rgani zation o f  Z a mbi a ( CA Z) was for med by 
:\ d o f  Parl iament in 1 96 6 .  Whi le  it  handled loan app lications by
s :rcil l  busines smen as we ll as by farme r s ,  the principa l· pu rpose of 
C:OZ was to finance rural a g r icultural production; over two -thirds of
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its loans went t o  s ma l l  farme r s .  B y  the end o f  1 967 gover nm1:rnt had 
lent the organization over 1 8  mi l lion kwacha. This repres ent e d  an 
increase  i n  the 'level of  credi t  available to s mal l - s cale  far me r s  on 
the order of 9 mi l lion kwacha by comparison with the period p r ior  to 
independen c e .  
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The infus ion of funds into rural agricultur a l  p roduction 
thus rose  dramatical ly unde r  the new A fr ican government. 
The creation of the mar keting agency in the mor e  r emote areas 
was also begun in this period.  Late in  1 964 the Ministry of A g riculture 
of the new African government as sumed direct  r esponsibi lity for the 
A g r i cultural Rural  Marketing S e r dce -- which  hitherto had s erved 
African farmers on the line of  r ai l  - - and extended its facil i ti e s  to 
the Northern and Luapula Provinces . In 1 965 ,  it r e cons tituted the 
agency as a statutory board,  entitled the Agricu lture Rur a l  Marke ting 
Board, and extended its facil i ti e s  to cove r the Northwestern ,  Barots e,  
and Eastern Provinces  as wel l ,  The Minister of  Agricu lture ,  at the 
inaugural  meet ing of the new agency, outlined the rationale for the 
ne\v s er vi c e :  
"It was Government ' s  intention t o  deve lop t h e  rur a l  ar eas ,  parti­
cula r ly in view of  the fac t  that  7 0  per cent of the population is on 
the land and ,  therefo r e ,  to improve the lives of the majority of  
the popu lation of  Zambia . . . .  He appreciated that  the s e rvic e s  
t o  b e  provid'ed in certain a r e a s  may p rove t o  be une conomi c ,  but 
if Government did not take the initiative to p rovide such s ervi c es 
the s e  areas wil l  s tagnate,  s o  that the Government is prepared to 
give financial support  to the poor in order to indirec t ly s upport  
the  peop l e .  . . . A financia l return cannot be  expected until 
(after s e \·c ra l  years of deve lopment in agr i cu lture ) .  1 1 52 
The credit  organization provided the initia l funding; the far mer 
exchange d  the s e  c r edits for fe r ti li zer ,  s eed, and imp lements from the 
marketing agencies to which they also  sold their produce ,  The joint 
,.., s u i t  was the growth o f  ag ricul tural p roduction in th� remoter  d is tr ict s ,
a g rowth that i s  perhaps hest indexed by the marketed production of 
maize ,  the principal  ag r icu l tural commodity in  Zambia .  
3 9  4 0  
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S B  
Marketed Sale 
Northwestern 
P r ovince 
1 ,  1 0 0  
1 , 300  
9 ,900  
1 4, 2 00 
TA BLE 1 2  
of Mai z e ,  Per  Year ,  
(Standar d  Bags )  
Luapala 
Province 
2 0 0  
4, 1 00 
6 ,8 0 0  
1 6 '  0 0 0  
2 2  , 400  
b:z:: Province 
Bar ots e 
Province 
T otal 
2 0 0  
300  5 , 5 00 
2 , 1 00 1 0, 2 0 0  
5 ,400  3 1 , 3 00 
1 8 , 600 5 5 , 2 0 0  
urce :  Agricu ltura l R ural Marketing Board ,  " F ifth Annual R eport for t h e  Year 
Ended 3 1 s t  Decembe r ,  1 9 6 8 ,  · •  mimeo,  n. p . , 1 96 9 ,  p .  5 .  
> te :  The  Board is  not  the primary marketing agency in rnai?;e  in Northern 
and Eas tern Provinces ;  there it i s  but a buyer of the surplus e s  
o f  co- ope rative marketing agenci e s ,  and so  figures for i t s  pur chas es in 
tho s e  provinces would be mis leading e s timates of the growth of 
p r oduction, 
T h e  bringing irito commer cial production of the more remote 
areas of Zambia was but one part of the gove.rnment 's  rura l  development 
effort .  The government also ope ned up new s chool s ,  cons tructed new 
hospitals and clinics , and bui lt and paved new r oads in the rural areas . 
A l l  told,  the re can be no doubt that the new government, capital rich 
and politica lly responsive to the African majority, mounted a leve l of 
capital exp<.>nditure in the rural  areas of Zambia that they had never 
exper ienced before .  Nonethe les s ,  proto - mig.rants' response to the
di ffe r entia l  between urban and rural  oppo r tuniti e s ,  and the  acceleration 
of the urban economy in pos t - independence Zambia -- at a rate in exce s s  
o f  that attained i n  almost any other deve loping nation i n  Africa - - was far
g t'Pate r than that in the count rys ide ,  Mo reover,  a l l  was not wel l  with 
the rural  development effort .  A s  a result ,  p r e s s ures mounted on 
government to r edouble its rural development effor t, even while u rban 
m igration continued .  
B .  The R ecommitment to  R ural  Inves tment: 
s ector was in fact going to encourage production in areas where p r ivate 
markets did not function, then the government was going to have to 
offs et the real e conomic costs of  this  commitment through increas ed 
financial out lays . T hus , the marketing agencies contended that they 
were bringing into the market vas t  numbers  of new producers ;  that 
they were distributing s eeds , fert i lizer s ,  and agricultural  i mp lements 
in ar eas where  the te chnology of agriculture had remained " unalter e d  
for centur i e s " ; and that in doing this , they were fo l lowing gove!'nment 
pol icy and so mus t  be adequat e ly financed by government .  The e conomic 
rea l iti e s  were such, they went on, that at current prices the s e rvices  
they offered could only be  furnished at  a las s .  In s hort,  the marketing 
agency demanded and got increas ed leve ls of subsidization. 
As an example of this argument, we can cite their year - e nd 
r eport to government in l 0 6 9 . A s  an index of their activities in the 
outlying area s ,  the s e rvices  noted that the volume of "Turnover [in these 
areas ] in  1 96 8  . . .  was twenty times that of  1 96 5  . . . .  1 1 5 3 but that  s ince
"Each ui the . . .  provinces i s  cons ider ed to be non-viable . • .  our
activit ies  m•1 s t  . . .  be subsidized,  The amount of the subsidy is  
s ubject to annual negotiation. T he bas is of  the s ubs idy calculated 
for the years up to and including 1 967 did not in our opinion s t and 
up to c ritical examination. 1 1 54
They there fo r e  as ked for ,  and got,  anothe r and larger subs idy fro m  govern­
n 1ent for the next fi s ca l  yea r .  In other yea r s ,  the rnar keling s ervi c e s  
o btained further s ubsidi l' s b y  making exten sive financial commitments
for the pu rpose  of far ming requisites anrl crop s ,  and then s imply pres enting 
the government with the b i ! l · for  these outlays . As it reported  in one year , 
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" By the beginning of 1 967  it became evident that the operating s ubsidies 
for each non-viable p rovince was hopeles s ly inadequate to do the job . .  
and we had the choice of either s ever e ly r e s tricting the act ivit ies  in each 
p rovince to minute levels or of  continuing the operations and incurring . 
5 5  
los s e s  
.
.
. 
1 1  T hey cho s e  t o  d o  the latter ,  A nd, for t he next year the 
marketing s ources reported, "In July the [agency] suffered the indignity 
of having its banker s  r efus e  to meet any checks it might draw. Aft e r  
a period o f  thre e  weeks , with t h e  height o f  t h e  maize-buying s eason 
upon us  during which i t  appeared that the whole operation might g r ind 
to a halt, the Ministry of Finance made ava ilable K 1 , 000 ,000 of K 1 , 50 0 , 000  
which the [agency] cons idered neces s ary for  the  succes sfu l  financing of 
56activities  for the r e mainder of  the yea r . "  
Whi l
.
e under p r e ssure from t h e  bureaucr<:cies that i t  h a d  jus t 
r ecently forged,  gove rnment was also under pressur e  from its cons t ituent s .  
Much o f  this pressure was i n  the for m  o f  vocal critic lsm b y  local party 
units of the p e r formance of the rural development agencies . The  local 
constituents c laimed that the organizations wer e  not giving suffici ent 
volume of s e rvices . T hey demanded increased amounts of loans , mor e  
convenient ar'range inents o f  t h e  delivery of r equisites and t h e  col lection of 
produce , lower interest  rates for loans ,  and lighter transport and handl.ing 
charges by the marketing agencie s .  In short ,  the local cons tituent� sought 
to compel  the public  s ector to bear the ful l  economic costs a s s o ciated 
with their pos ition of dis advantage in the market.  T hus in 1 96 7  the loca l  
fa rmers in  Luapu la  Province r efused to transport their produce to des .ig ­
nated pick-up points and  instead demanded that the  marketing agency co l -
lect their goods at  their far m s ;  without oxen and wagons , much less  
motor transport ,  the  far mers could not  bear  the s e  cos t s ,  and  instead 
demanded that they be borne by the more l iber.al ly  endowed public agencies . 5 7
Both as a r e s ult ,  and as a measur e of the increase in pres sure.we can 
note the mounting los s es of the marketing agencies in the rural s ectors  as 
they both inc reased the volume of their s e rvices and pas s ed on fewer o f  
lhc cos ts t o  the rural producers .
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Popu lar crit icism also focused on the quality of the s e rvic e s  
whi ch the publ ic  s ector p rovided. T h e  local producers frequently, 
and jus tifiably, protested that whi le the volume of the s e rvices  was 
increasing, their nature was s uch that i t  was doing little good. T h e s e  
criticisms m o s t  frequently focused  i n  t h e  rural  credi t  organization, 
The local  farmer s  r e ceived seasonal L-oans fro m  the credit services  
and used thes e to  purchas e s eeds and fert i lizer  from the  mar keting 
agenc ies .  But the  flood of  app lications was such that the credit 
organization was s low in approving the loans , and orders for seasonal
r equi s ites were  placed with the marketing agencies far too late in  the 
s eason for them to adjus t their i nventories  and del ivery s chedules s o  
a s  to provis ion the farmers in t ime . Loans wer e  made; deliveries 
did arr ive , but they ar rived so  l ate in the agricu ltural s eason that 
the rural farmer was often no better off. Inde ed,  because of the 
t iming of the delive r i e s ,  he was often unable to s ecure a good enough 
harvest to repay the loans , and so  was accumulating iebts to the very 
c redit agency that was suppo.:ed  to improve his e conomic  s tanding . 5 8 
T h e  local producers wer e  in no position to uti lize  market  
s anctions to  upgrade the quality of  the  s e rvices they  received.  T h e r e  
wer e n o  competing fac i lities that would a l low them t o  transfer their 
demand to s ources of s upply that provided better s ervices . It was , 
a fter a l l ,  th e absence of such sources whi ch had inspired the mounting 
of publi c s e r d ces in the firs t  p lace .  A s  a result ,  the rural producers
had  re cours e only to nonmarket sanctions : politica l  prote s t  and 
publ ic d i s s ent.  
M o s t  often, t his  dis s ent remained pure ly local . · It showed
up in comp l aints to touring offi c e r s ,  petitions by farmers and vi llage
g roups to boma offic ials , and in hos tile ques tions pos ed to the loan 
and markt' l i n g  agen c i e s  by the reg ional party offic e r s .  At othe r tim e s ,  
t h e  d i s s ent w a s  s uffici c-ntly g reat that t h e  loc;il po l i tica l  and ad ministra­
t i v �  r,ffi c ia ls  fe l t  compel led to petition en rnas H e  to  thn  c "ntral govern-
ni r,nt  l < >  i mp r ove the p e r fn l' nian ce of its l o c a l  s e rv i c e .  Thus , for
examp le ,  the public officials of Nche lenge sent the fo l lowing report 
to the 1'1inistry of Development and National Guidanc e ,  Lusaka: 
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" T he farmers . . .  complain bitter ly that loans are paid very 
late in F ebruary to May after the cultivation period, In the same 
way s e eds and a l l  farming requis i tes  are is sued to farms late . .
thus no far mer tnakes good use  of his loan. 1 1 5 9 
To this report,  the local  officer of the M inistry of A griculture added 
his name and noted bitt e r ly: 
"Just as reported in Mar ch  last  year the Quasi-Governmental 
bodies like . . .  [ the]  Marke ting Board and Agr icultural  Finance
Company [ the  credit  organization] frus trated the  expectations 
which  we were expecting. Loans and farming requisites were 
not given to far mers in  time and in  some cases were not ever 
given . . .  
T he Marketing Board a ls o  d id  not give : 
7 farmers 
4 farn1ers
-n farmers
5 x J O O lbs .
15 x 2 5  l bs .
2 04 t ins
Citing his  dis tr i ct target s ,  he concluded :
X mixtur e [ fertil izer]
maize s e eds 
g roundnut seeds " 
"Ins tead of having 5 0 0  acres maize we have 40 0  acres , Ins tead
of having 5 5 0  acres of nuts we have 50 acres . 1 1 60 
T his d i s s ent, however ,  someti mes spread beyond the pur e ly ·  
local  level and outs ide o f  the channe ls  o f  bureaucratic prot est ,  It  d id  
so  when ambitious P.o liticians vied for votes , and aggregated the  fee lings 
of frustration behind broader political  s ymbols .  At this point, com­
peting politicians trans lated rur a l  diss atisfaction into the forces  o·f 
po liti ca l  provinciali sm in Z ambia .  
T her ·! are nu1nerous ins tances of this phenomenom. In  a lmos t 
eve ry cas e ,  the origins of provincial  protest lie wi th the national leve l 
leaders who were  s eeking higher offices  in. the govern ing par ty; in the 
pos t - independence period,  promotion to party o ffice led to higher 
go·;e rnmental offices  as  well .  T o  gene rate and s upport backing for
the i r cand i dacie s ,  the c laimants utilized appeals to thei r po liticat  
cons t i t • 1 t • 1Jts , and the s e  inva riably s t r e s sed the e <"onorn i c  d i s advantages 
of their  po litical " under - repres entation" at the higher leve ls  of the 
p arty and of government -- an unde r - repres entation that could be 
over come by the s o lid s upport of their candidacy. 
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T he fir s t  such provincia l  movements too k  place in connection 
with the 1 967 elections to the top offices in the governing party - - the 
fir s t  s uch e l e ctoral  conte s ts in the his tory of UNIP. In the cours e 
of the e l ection s ,  the candidates for the top offices  a l lied  into two 
cotnpeting s la te s :  one for med by po liticians from· the Eastern and 
Bar ots e P rovince ,  and the other by candidates from the Northern 
and Southern P rovinces .  The latter s late won, but the for mer  group 
of cand.idates continue d after the e lection to propound the appeals 
they had us e d  from the beginning of their campaigns ,  that their pro­
vinces were financially ignored by the governme nt whi le  the provinces 
of tho s e  who he ld top office· were favored ins tead. The result was 
that the gover ning party be came organized into p rovincial factions , a nd 
that thes e fa ctions became avai lable at e lection time to riva l parties 
parties that threatened to overturn the government its e lf.  
The cogency of this dynamic is best revealed in the case of 
Barot s e .  A high ranking official  from Barotse ,  one Mundia, had been 
exp e lled  from the Cabinet in  1 966  for  financia l  mis feasance; in  196  7 
he joine d  with a group of minor po liticians to for m  a party in opposi ­
tion to the governing party - - a party which they named the United 
Party (UP ) .  U P  r emained but a minor threat t o  t h e  governing party
until  the latte r ' s  internal e lections in August of 1 96 7 .  At  that time, 
when  many of  Barots e 1 s  p o litical e lite los t  their offices  in the governing 
party and ther efor e  in the government i tse lf, U P ' s  c laim that Barot s e 
s tood to los e  out e conomical ly in independent Zambia became more 
cogent .  Ba l'ots e was in  fact poo r .  It had been the lea s t  developed 
o f  the provinces under the colonial government .
6 1  
And its heri tage 
o f  poor roads and poor s ervices , as wel l  as th_e low in itia l leve l
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of its exis ting facilities  at the time of  independence ,  made it particu­
larly difficult for government to implement effective deve lopment 
programs in that area .  A dding to the problem was the increas ed 
unemployment in Barotse that r esulted in the larg e - s ca le repatriation 
of labor to the area from the countries to  the s outh, fo l lowing Z ambi a ' s  
independence a n d  its ter mination o f  labor r ecruiting agreements in 
the area.  T he s e  grievance s ,  compounded by the poor performan c e  
o f  the public s e rvic e s  develop e d  for rural  producers ,  offer ed ferti le
g rounds for thos e s eeking votes agains t  the new Zambian gove r nment. 
The s eries of violent clashes between Mundia ' s  United Party and the 
members of the governing party led to the banning of the forme r ,  but 
loca l  cons tituents nonethe les s lodged their protes t  against the e co nomi c  
conditions in B arotse Provi nce ;  i n  the 1 96 8  e l ection, eight o f  e leven 
cons tituencies in  the province switched from the governing party to 
the major lega l  opposition, the African National Congress . C o mp e ­
tition within U i\ [ P  l ed  to s imi lar moven-1ents o f  provincial dis s e nt in
the Northwestern P rovinc e ,  the Eastern Provinc e ,  and Luapu l a .  
Whi le none l e d  t o  s ubs equent dis affe ction t o  opposition parties ,  a l l  
under lined the fragility o f  t h e  gove r nment ' s  po litical  b a s e  and thus 
the necess ity for ame liorating the conditions of l i fe in the rur a l  areas 
that gave curr en cy to t he s e  p rovincial movements .  6 2
Pres s ures from its own agencies and t h e  p roven capacity 
of po liticians to uti lize rura l  dis content to undermine the pos i tion of 
government - - both factors led in the period 1 9 6 8  to. 1 ') 70 to major
adjus tments by government in its rural development p rogram. In 
r espons e to the s e  pres s ur e s ,  the prob lem of rural development 
moved c loser  to the top of  the gove rnment ' s  agenda. 
Many of the adjustments were  ad ministrative in natu r e ,  Thus , 
prior lo the e lection o f  1 96 8 ,  government announced that immediately
fo llowing the e lections it would decent ra lize the bureauc ratic s tructure 
of  the country . The pe r formance of its depa r tments and agencies ,
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government officials contended, could be enhanced were they ove r s een 
and s crutinized by the p o lit.ical  officials who were r espons ive to the 
needs and demands of the populace. A t  the dis t r ic t  level ,  ther e  were  
to be po litically appointed district governors ; . in addition, each p r o ­
vince was t o  have a mini s ter  o f  cabinet rank in charge of coordinating 
the ope rations of governmental agencies in the area .  The governor 
was to be in charge of distr i ct development committee s ,  and the 
ministers, in  charge of provincial development committee s .  T he 
people ,  through these p o litica l  offi cials , were to be able to lodge 
their comp laints with the deve lopment committee s  which could then 
pressure the admini s trators to rectify their  grievances . T he decen­
tra lization effort  was thus aimed at  improving the capacity of the 
government ' s  admini s tration to deliver the benefits of public pro­
grams to the rural  areas and to make the public s ervice� mor e  r e ­
s pons ive t o  the demands of the rural  dwe l le r s .  The imp l e mentation 
of thes e meas u:-es was of course  contingent upon the ree le ction of 
the government to power .  Rural  dis content, brought to bear through 
pol i tica l mechani s ms ,  thus evoked major adminis t r ative innovations 
in s upport of r u r a l  progr es s .  
A s econd set  of reforms ,  which were i mp lemented s ho r t ly 
after  the 1 96 8  e l ection, involved the regrouping of the majo r  s e rvi ces 
involved in the rural development effort .  In his addr e s s  at the opening 
of the s e s s i on of the n ewly elected National A s s embly, the P r esident  
announced that  a l l  of  the major departments invo lved with rur a l  deve lop­
ment - - the departments of agricultur e ,  cooperatives ,  lands , natura l  
r esources , marketing , community deve lopment, etc .  - - were to be com ­
bined i n  o n e  majo r  mini s try,  the Minis try o f  R ur a l  Development. This
min i s try was to coordinate and implement depar tmental  progr ams 
a i rned al  upg rading rural  life , and was to overs e e  the perfo rmance
of l he para s tatal agencies invo lved with the rural development pro-
. . 1 h d'  d k t '  · 63g r; un - - in partLcu a r ,  t e e r e  it organ zation an mar · e  mg s er vice s .  
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A s  p a r t  o f  this r eorganization, the government r econstructed both 
the r ural m arketing and c r edit agencie s .  It also r efinanced these  o rgani­
z ations and did so in  a way that r educed the lo sses  in public r evenues that 
were to be incurred b y  extending s ervices into relatively unprofitable a r eas . 
In both cases ,  the g overnment combined i ts s ervices to the e conomically
viable producers  - - the commercial farme r s  on the line of rail - - with the 
s e rvic es to the uneconomical village produc e r s ;  by linking the for tunes of 
the two s ec to r s  unde r  a common s e t  of programs, it, in e s se nce,  u s e d  the 
p rofits gel:\erated by the one to offs e t  the lo s s e s  generated by the other .  
In the case o f  the marketing agencies ,  the off - the-line -of- r ail 
p rovinces had been s erved by the Agricultural Rural Marketing Board and 
thos e  on the line of rail by the G rain Marketing Board.  While the latter 
orga�ization had consis tently operated at  a l o ss ,  this loss  represented
larg ely the difference between the p roducer and sales price of agricultural 
commodities  - - a difference which government willingly s ub s idized as a means 
of k e eping the s ales  prices  to urban consumer s  low. However,  the c en tral 
location of its opera tion s ,  the efficiencies it could achieve from handling 
large guantitie s  of supplies and produce, and the experti s e  it maintained 
in management, financial, and tec hnical offices meant that the marketing 
board in fact  operated as  a r elatively efficient and economic organization. 
When, in September of 1969, the government combined its operations with 
those of the r ural marketing board, it ther efore sought to make available 
to the rural farmers the efficiencies  that it achieved in the more  produc-
tive farming areas.  Thus , for example ,  the line of rail depots were made
available for s tockpil ing and s to r ing fer til i z e r s  and s eeds prior to distri­
bution to the p rovinces ;  orders for  imports of farming reguisites  for the
provinc es could now be combined with tho s e  of the comm e rcial farm e r s ,
and c; o  b e  rnade mo re  cheaply; transpo rt  could, i f  nec e s s a r y, b e  dive1·ted 
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from· the pool avai lable to commercia l  farmers to the provincial  pro­
ducer s ;  and the  accounting and managerial experti s e  that had been 
concentrated in developing depots , inventories , dis tr ibutional tech­
niques for the large- s cale farmer were now to be made avai lable for 
s imilar purpo·se s  to the emer gent producers .. 
The combination of the two s ervices into what was called 
the Nation a l  A gr icultural Marketing Board (NAMBoardJ made i t  pos s ible  
to share  the s uperior services of the  cente-1" with the  r e latively im­
poverished s e rvices  available to the more r emote areas . To help 
finance the operations of its marketing agency, the government then 
made s ever a l  deci s ions , each of which rendered the commercially 
viable s ector of its operations even more "profitabl e" and offs et the 
losses  incurred by its services to the more r e mote farms . For one ,  
the government continued its policy of making the marketing agency 
the monopo ly buyer of the major commercial  crops . For farmers 
in the  outlyi ng provinces , this choice was of little s ignifi cance as 
few alternative n1ar kets exis ted, For the commercial  far me r ,  however ,  
the  policy had the effect of s tabiliz ing the  pr i ce of p roduc e .  At  times
of reduced demand, the po licy would have been to their advantage . 
But the late 1 96 ll ' s  was a time of radical ly increas ing demand, and 
the policy meant that the commercia l  producers had to s e ll  at a
cheaper price  than they would have otherwis e obtained. T he gains 
from the monopoly market therefore accrued to the marketing agency, 
and helped reduc e the lo sses  it incurred by extending its s e rvices off
the l ine of  rail .  A s  a result of a second governmenta l decis ion, 
NAMBoard became a monopoly supplier of critical agricultural input s .  
In 1 970 t h e  government literally clos ed down the major private ferti ­
Lbo e r  dis tributing companie s ,  Leaving NAMBoard the exc lµsive supplier
of ferti l izer  and chemical products to the farme r .  In part ,  this measure 
wa s taken s o  as to prated the ma rket for the p roducts o f  a newly 
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comple ted Zambian Ierter l izer  manufacturing p lant, and thereby 
linking the agricultural  demand for inputs with newly creat'ed domes tic 
manufacturing cap acity. But the measure also  had the effect of en­
s uring the marketing agency monopoly profits to be gained from trade 
in this commodity. The principal  benefit to NAMBoard was its abi lity 
to dispatch its extension speciali s ts to the outlying areas to advise  in 
the ·  application of fertil izer and chemical p roducts . The provision 
of this advisory s e rvice,  rather than price ,  had been the principal 
comp etitive weapon utilized by fe rti liz.er suppliers in Zambia .  By 
moving to a monopoly pos i tion vis -a-vis  the commercial farme r s ,  
NAMBoard could guarantee their continued patronage while reducing 
the quality of its servic e s ,  and the reby gain the ability to trans fer 
the s e  s ervices to the s ma l ler  farmer.  64
An ana lagous pattern was fo llowed in the provisioning of 
rural credit. G iven the une conomic nature of production in the out­
lying areas,  the rate of default in government inves tments in rural 
far ming was high; and, given conditions of traditiona l tenur e, the 
government was unable to recover ass ets so  as to cover its los s e s ,  
even had remote farmland been o f  commercial va lue. As a res ult, 
the government s ought to improve the actu?.rial  bas i s  of its inve s t­
ments by compelling the participation of the commercia l  agricu ltural 
s ector in its agricultural  cr edit programs , In September of 1 96 8 ,  
the Ministry o f  Finance announ ced that no far me r  could obtain credit
. fro 1n co mme rcial banks if h e  owed money to the govern.ment credit
organization , A s  an es timated 'l5 percent of the commercial farmers
had s easonal  loans with the credit organization which could not be 
repaid until harvest time, this meant that virtually al l  comme rcial  
fa rmers had to turn to the credit organi zat ion for al l other fo rms of 
fi nan c ing -- financing whi c:h they hithe rto had sought from private 
sources , The result was that the organi zation received a radical 
increase  in the vo lume of  comn1e rcially viable loans; and by charging 
5 1  
ntere s t  in exc e s s  of that charged by comme rcial  s ource s ,  i t  was abl e  
: o  offs et i n  part the losses i t  incurred by inves ting i n  economi ca l ly 
6 5  
inviable agricultu ral  production in the out lying areas . 
Despite the government ' s  attempts to revitalize its credit 
program, the credit organization f a  i 1 e d .  I t s  v o l u n1 e  o f
:ibligations - - for the purchas e of far m  imp l e ments , s e as onal inputs , 
rnd supp lies - - exceeded its abil ity to col lect  r epayments , and its 
lnterest  charges on the commercially viable loans s imply could not 
nake up the difference. 
6 6 · In 1 970, the government there had to
assume the debt s .  The government de cided no longer  to use rural 
�redit  as a primary means of s t imulating rural production; rather 
.t sought to inc r eas e rur a l  production by manipulating the prices for 
1gri cultura l  inputs and produc e .  
C The Special  Case  of  Prices : 
The change to price incentive s was a crucial one .  For it 
struck at one o f  the core p roblems that had crippled al l  efforts at
lncreasing rur a l  production:  the abs ence of suffi cient incentives to 
:he vil lage farmer.  
In  en c CJnraging rural production, the government had em-
.Jhas ized the g l' owing of  maize .  Not only was this  a bas ic  crop in 
l,ambia, but  a lso ,  succes sful maize pr oduction requires less  inten­
s ive initial tra ining and s ub s equent extension support.  Land prepara ­
tion, planting , s pacing, weed and p e s t  contro l - - a l l  were r elative ly 
; traightfo rward by comparison with, s ay, the cultivation of tobacco 
n vegetab les . Las t ly, maize was not highly perishable and so  could  
withs tand trans port to  the  urban markets from the  more re.mote areas . 
fhe mar keting and extension services thus encouraged the e me.rging 
'armers to p lant high proportions of their acreage in that crop. 
The principa l problem with this po l icy, howeve r ,  was that 
1 t  t h P  s a m e t ime,  the government ' s  pri cing po li cy was running in a
5 2  
completely opposite dire:tion. A s  can be s e e n  i n  Table 1 4, the govern­
ment reduced the price offered for maize  by the marketing agencies 
throughout the firs t s everal years of independence.  Local far mers , 
who had got credit from government, who had accepted the guidance 
of its extension workers (often a prerequi s i te for getting credit) ,  and 
who therefore p lanted heavi ly in maize, found that the prices offered  
for their p roduce were  declining. Not  surprisingly, they  a lso  found 
that it was increasingly difficult to repay their debts to government. 
TA BLE 1 4  
Price and OutEut of Mai.ze 
Marketed 
Harves t  Years Price Output 
(K/  200 lbs . ) (Mi l l ions of 200 
1 96 3 / 64 3 .  70 1 .0 
1 96 4 / 6 5  3 . 45 2 . 1  
1 96 5 / 6 6  3 .4 5  2 . 8  
1 96 6 / 6 7  3 .  3 2  4 . 2  
1 96 7 / 6 8  3 . 1 0  4 . 1  
1 96 8 / 6 9  2 . 90 2 . 7  
1 96 9 / 70 3 . 2 0  2 . 8  
1 970 / 7 1  3 . 5 0  1 .4 
l 9 7 1 I 72 4 .00  4 .4  
lb . bag s )  
Sourc e :  A l e x  Tweedy e t .  a l . , "Agriculture i n  Z ambia, " draft manuscript forthcoming 
as Z a mbian Paper Number 9 (Lus aka: Ins titute for A frican Studies ,  1 9 7 3 ) ,
Tables 6 and 2. 0 .  
Note :  For  harve s t  years ,  ! s t  May to  30th Apri l .  The price i s  the line o f  ra i l
pr ice  fo r G r ade A n1aizc .
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The fact  of independen ce was its elf the principal reason for 
the change in price  and pr ice  p o li cy.  Prior to independenc e ,  the 
commercial  far ming, s ettler population had been an important sour c e  
o f  support for the co lonial government. I t  had therefore been able to
gain a p ricing po licy which  generated production far in excess  of 
national demand , and the government as s i s ted  in disposing of the 
surplus es on the wor l d  market,  mos t frequently at a loss which  it 
helped to offs et with the public r evenues .  By the 1 96 2 - 6 3  crop year ,  
maize exports wer e  over 3 , 000 ,000  bags - - a figure which was a lmos t 
double the level of domestic cons umption, 
6 7  With independence , of
course ,  the polit ical  base of the government altered, and there  was 
litt le wi llingness  to us e public  funds to dispose of s urp lus production 
by the European produce r s .  The new governmept instead changed 
to a policy of encouraging production to supply only the nationa l 
markets ;  and t'1is change ,  of cour s e ,  entailed a reduction in t h e
price of maize .  The deliberations of the A gricultural Marketing 
Committee which for mulated  the s e  recommendations revealed little 
consideration of their imp lications for the newly emergent rural 
producer -- precis e ly tho s e  who wer e  the least  able to take refuge 
h k . f 68 in t e mar et1ng o a l te rnate crop s .  
P rotests by the agencies involved i n  the rur a l  deve lopment 
e ffort ,  and by loca l  p arty units who acted as spokes men for the 
interes t  of vi l lage farmer s ,  provoked a �eview of the pricing policy 
in 1 966 .  The government s t i l l  oppos ed increas ing the price of maize ;
mos t of the benefi t ,  i t  fe lt ,  would b e  captured  by commerci a l  pro­
duc e r s ,  and the s e  in turn would over supply the market thereby again
depress ing the prices  and once again threatening the eme rgent pro­
duce r .  Ins tead, the gove rnment chose to subsidize the price of  the
agric.:ultur a l  inputs s o ld by its marketing agenci e s ;  the subsidy was
s e l e ctive , and applied only to sales  in the more remote province s ,
ther eby benefiting the government ' s  constituents and the s ubjects of 
1 l . 6 9  i t s  rural  deve opment po icy. 
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F o r  a variety o f  reas ons , the reduced price o f  maize had 
remarkably littl e  initial impact  on the l evel of national p roduction. 
The p r imary reason appears to have been the level of ins ecuri ty in 
the commercial  farming community. Uncertain as to i ts  fortunes 
under the new r egime, and facing increas ingly difficult problems i n  
repatriating earnings abroad, increased  level s  o f  wages b y  local  
agricultura l  labor ,  and more e'-.--pensive credit,  the . European farmers
changed their patterns of production by shifting away from produce 
requiring heavy investment and much labor ,  such as beef p roduction 
or tobacco, and into crops like maize,  which required little of either .  
70 
The result in the mid- l 960 's once again was a leve l of maiz e  pro­
duction that  far exceeded domes ti c  cons umption, and a further de­
c r e a s e  by gov c ,. :1:nent in the price  of maize .  
In  the la te  1 96 0 ' s  and the fir s t  years o f  the 1 9 70 ' s ,  howeve r ,  
the g overnment was compel led  t o  a l t e r  its policie s .  For one, the 
damage to the government ' s rural  constituency was becoming wel l  
known. Loans to rural farmers  were not being repaid, protests 
against the dep !" e s s ed levels of rural income were mounting, and the 
movement to the cities by inc reased numbers of vil lage dwe l lers  had 
become a conce rted flow. For  anothe r ,  the depressed  leve l of agri­
cultural  prod·.iction w a s  beginning to threaten the very cor e  of the 
government ' s  · ' e \• e lopment policy ,  its commitment to indus trializa­
tion. T he p r  c. c i p i t a t i n g  factor for both the s e  inputs into the pricing 
dec i s ion was t h e  inflation of the mid- 1 96 0 '  s ,  
In the mid- 1 96 0 '  s ,  the tremendous inves tments mounted by 
the public s ect r ,r  had begun to take their  toll .  A s  r e flected in the 
i ndex of cons Jncer prices (Table  o J ,  increas ed demand for goods had 
beglln to bid up pr ices .  Severa l  conditions peculiar to Z a mbia added 
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t o  t h e  proble m. For one,  compounding the effect of increas ed  public 
e:>..-penditure was the increased demand from p rivate cons umers - - a 
demand r e leas ed by the wage increases obtained by labor in the im­
mediate pos t - independence period, For another ,  nearly 5 0  per cent 
of the government ' s  finances derived fro_m taxes t ied to the price of
copper and not to the p rofits of the mining indus try; with the ris ing 
price  of copp e r ,  the incr eases  in government revenues did not produce 
a decreas e in private demand, and the level  of  total  demand therefore 
burgeoned. Last ly, Z ambia pos s e s s ed an underdeveloped economy; 
the very purpos e  of the investment program was to generate s uffi cient 
capacity to produce goods . Without adequate capacity, industry was 
unable to s upply goods at  a rate commensurate with the demand for 
them. Zambia was therefore hig h ly sus ceptible to inflation under 
h d . 
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conditions of h i g  gove rnmental  expen iture .  
Inflation had  two effects which are critical  to  our  analysis . 
For one ,  coming at a time when for at least  one major crop dome s ti c  
agricultural  prices were decreas ing, inflation .meant that the terms 
of trade shifted unfavorably against rural produce r s .  7 2  Not on ly were
they often receiving less  for this produce; but a lso ,  at any given level 
of earning s ,  they, could p urchas e less manufactured o,utput. Without 
communsurate i mp rovements in their levels of production, the rura l  
earnings of  farmers declined; and i t  i s  known that, a t  leas t  
i n  the cas e o f  the vi l lag e r s  who entered the market  through coope rative s ,  
l d . . 
7 3  F this level o! p roduction was abysmally ow an not tncreas ing .  or
tho s e  just  entering propuction, or  thinking about do ing  s o ,  who  lacked 
the training and equipment to increas e their level of output at a rate 
at least  that  of  the s hifting terms of trade , agricultural production 
was therefore a los ing p ropos i tion .  The  effe ct of i nflation was mos t  
li k e ly t o  d e c r e as e the incomes o f  these  rural dwe l l e 1· s  who had just
entered agricultural production and we re inefficient;  and to cause
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many rural dwellers to  remain o u t  o f  commercial production alto g e t  her  
and  in the  s helter of the  s ubsistence economy. For the s ak e  of  its 
rural policy, the government the r efore had a s trong incentive to incr e a s e  
agricultural  price s .  
TA BLE ·1 5  
Indices of Barter T erms o f  Trade Between Marketed 
African Agri cultural  Produetion and 
R epres entati ve C onsumer Goods 
( 1 96 4  = 1 00 )  
Including marketed  fis h  
Excluding marketed fis h  
1 964 
1 00 . 0  
1 o o . o  
1 965 
9 9.6 
9 9 .4 
1 966 
96 . 1  
9 6.5 
1 967  
1 02 .  7 
9 2 . 3  
1 96 8  
89. 1 
80 . 0  
Source :  Fabian J .  M .  l\liambo and James Fry, An Inves tigation into the Change 
in the T erms of Trade :B etween the Rural and U r ban Sectors of  Zambia , " 
African Social  R es earch,  N o .  1 2 , (December 1 9 7 1 )  p .  1 08. 
A s econd cons equence ,  and one that dominated governmenta l  
dis cus s ions o f  the p roblem, was that inflation produced a radical in­
creas e in the volume of imports . The value of goods i mported increased  
from K 1 42 .9  mi l lion in 1 964 to a lmos t K 400, 0 mil lion in 1 9 7 1 .  
A n  examination of the imports reveals that by far the most  important 
reason fo.r thci r increas e  was the over 300 percent ris e in .  the volume of 
imported machinery and transport equipment. 74 T his r ise  was of
cours e cons is tent with the government ' s  investment program, and 
thus pos e d  no particular problem to policy makers .  More  distress ing 
to government was the increase in the impo rtation of agr icultural 
p roducts . Whi le the re lative s ha r e  of agr i culture in imports s tayed 
cons tant at about 1 2.  pe r ccnt of all imports , the abso lute volume of 
imports more than doublP.d  ove r this period; and in I J 7 2 ,  for which
the· figures  are not as yet availabl e, the bill for agricultural imports 
1 96 9  
8 4. 4  
74.8 
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ros e s harply refle cting the eme rgency importation o f  maize to offs et  
the s hort-fa l l  of 1 9 70 - 7 1  crop  s eason. The need to import 3.  5 mil lion 
bags of maize in 1 9 7 1 ,  at a time in which copper earnings were de­
clining as a result of  fal ling world prices  and reduced domes tic pro­
duction (due  to  a major mining accident at Mufulira) s everely threatened 
Zambi a ' s  capacity to finance the imp o rtation of capital equipment 
without depleting her foreign r e s e rves . The government therefore 
saw it  as  crucial that agricultura l  production be increas ed.  The 
threat to Z ambia ' s  foreign trade pos ition s e rved as an im-
p or tant incentive to increase the price of agricultural commodities .  
The pr ice  increases  came in  three  stages .  The firs t  was 
in 1 96 9 - 1 9 7 0  and entailed s imply a s light increase in the overall  price 
of mai z e .  A s econd increase was announced for the 1 9 7 0 - 1 9 7 1  crop 
s ea s on ,  but this time was linked with a "floor price" of K 3 . 2 0 .  The 
floor price  ensured that the government and not the rural farmer 
would dire ctly abs orb the price of transport;  the marketing s e rvices 
could not  adjust  prices  be low K 3 . 2 0 to  take into account the cost  of 
7 5  
transport o r  handling. This o f  course repres ented a n  increas e in 
prices s pe cifi cal ly  for the outlying farmers . Following large maize 
imports during that crop year , the governn1ent announced  even more 
ext ensive price changes .  For the 1 9 7 1 - 1 9 7 2  s eas on, it raised the 
floor price of mai ze to K 3 . 5 0 ,  and in addition offered a 30 perc ent 
subs idy for imports of seed  and fertilizer . Both changes were an­
noun ced well b e fore  p lanting, and so could more effective ly be taken 
into account by agricultural producers . 7 6  This s eries of price in­
creas es  s ignificantly r eversed the decline of national maize p roduc­
tion and led as  well  to a s trong revival in the share of the s mall- s cale 
A frican producers in the overall  crop. 
Crop 
Year 
1 % 2 / 6 3  
1 96 3 / 64 
1 9 6 4 / 6 5  
1 96 5 / 66 
1 96 6 / 6 7  
1 9 6 7 ' 6 8  
1 96 8 / 6 9  
1 96 9 / 70 
1 9 7 0 / 7 1  
1 9 7 1 / 72 
TA BLE 1 6  
Total Maize D e  liveries t o  National 
Marketing Services 
(In ' 00 0  s tandard 2 0 0  lb .  bags ) 
Total A frican Farming 
Bags Bags 
N % 
2 1 2 7 8 3 9  3 9 . 4  
1 0 0 9  ,3 5 4  3 5 . 1  
2 1 3 9 7 9 7  3 7 .  3 
2 8 0 4  6 7 5  2 4 . 1 
4 1 6 3  1 5 8 1  3 8 . 0  
4 1  n 1 5 7 9  3 8 . 2  
2 7 ·1 :-1 1 024 3 7 . 3  
2 7 '1 ]  7 3 3  2 6 . 3  
1 3 7 1  2 7 1  1 9 . 8  
4 1 -1 0  1 6 3 1  3 9 . 4  
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Sub s is tence 
African F ar ming 
Bags 
N 
N . A .  
" 
" 
I I  
I I  
I I  
1 2 3 ( 
N . A .  
" 
I I  
% 
N . A .  
" 
I I  
4 . 4 7  
N . A .
I I  
I I  
Sour ce :  R epublic  o f  Z ambia, Minis try o f  Rural Development, Monthly 
Statis tical Bulletin ,  August 1 97 1 , p . ·  5, and Se cond National
National Development P lan, p. I 74.
I t  is in teresting to note how gov.er.nment financed these  p ri c e  
inc reas e s .  I t  did not pas s  thern o n  to the urban consume r ;  rather ,  i t  
bo t· rowed f rom i t s  own capital ac count t o  make u p  lhe diff�rence between 
the  producer  and consumer prices of maize . The government in effe c t
redistributl·ri future goods t o  pres ent cons umption; and g iven that inves t ­
ments i n  the r u r a l  s e ctor can, b y  and large,  only be made b y  the public 
s e c: lor ,  it i s  not. unlikely that a large proportion of the benefit of the 
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s ubs idy - - t h e  increased consumption l eve l o f  the urban consumer - ­
was created at  the expens e o f  the generation o f  future goods for rur a l  
dwe llers . 77
IV 
CONCLUSION 
We have thus examined the pattern of development in Zambia,  
and noted the high rate of capital for mation in the indus trial and urban 
s ector .  We have noted both that the nature of the a rena within which 
public  inves tment decis ions get made and the ideology of  the decis ion 
makers thems e lves has encouraged a leve l  of inve stment off the line 
of rail  that is  unprecedented in the his tory of  the nation. Political pres sures from 
bureauc rac ie s, the forces  cf. provincialism, and the occurrence of e lec tions ,
w e  n o t e d , have led to a continuation of the s e  inves tments ; and 
genuine fears that the further importation of capital goods could be 
limited by payments abroad fo r food have l e d  to the es tablishment of 
appropriate incentives for increased rura l  production. 
Nonetheles s ,  as we argued at the commen cement of this e s s ay ,  
proto-migrants decide whether t o  move on the bas i s  o f  earnings diffe r entia ls . 
We know that the investments in the industrial  and manufacturing a c tivities 
have incre a s e d  both in number o f  jobs and the level  of wages in  the urban 
s e ctor.  Both can only have enhanced the attractiveness of the urban 
s e ctor to tho s e  who were contemplating the prospe cts of departing from 
their vil lag e s .  W e  a lso  know that whil e  the level o f  rural inves tment 
has increas ed radically, p roblems associated with the quality o f  
the s e  investments and the pricing policies of government make i t  l ikely 
that the r e turns to rural production have not kept pace with the ri s e  of 
ea rning s ' potentials  in the urban H ector .  
W e  have few direct  measures o f  rural ,  per capita 
earnings that would al low us dire ctly. to compare the potential 
for earnings in the rural and urban s e ctor s .  We do, however ,  
have some crude e s timates .  T hus , Cambridg e  economist 
H. A .  Turn e r ,  in his examination of wages and incomes in 
Zambia, e s timated that the average annual earnings ,  including 
s ubsis tence ,  for peas ant farmers in 1 96 8  was K 1 4 5 ;  by contras t ,  
the average annual earnings for African miners were K 1 , 3 0 0  
and thos e for e mployee s  outside the mines ,  K 640 .  The in-
crease  in real  terms in the  average annual . earnings of  the  
latter two catego ries of urban wage earners we.re 3 5  and 5 2  percent
r espectively since 1 964 .  By contrast,  Turner con"c luded, the 
ayerage annua l increase in the real earnings of Afr ican peasant 
f · 1 ·  h d b b t 3 . . d d 78 am1 ies  a een u pe rcent s ince �n epen ence .  \Yith
such diffe renti a l s ,  and with such apparently accelerating d if­
ferentia l s ,  the incentive to leave the countrys ide was a powe r ­
ful for ce i n  post- independence Z ambia. 
Much more sophi s ti cated est imate s  come from a census
of subs is tence farme r s  conducted by the Centra l  Statis tica l  
Offic e  in 1 96 8 .  In this cens us ,  the enumerators  attempted 
to as s ign mon"y values to the subs i s tence product of  a national 
s ample of Ltrm famil ies ;  they as sumed that the s e  sales  would 
l argely be made outs ide the publ ic ly sponsored mark..,ts . 
l eas t  two o f  thei r r e.suits des erve noti c e .  (Table 1 7 )
A t  
60  
Province 
L uapala  
Northern 
Eas tern 
Southern 
C entral 
C opper belt 
N orth Wes tern 
Wes tern 
Z ambia 
TA BLE 1 7  
C r ops Produced by African Subsistence 
Farmers , 1 96 8 / 6 9 ,  b y  Province
6 1
Farm Value of  Six  Principal Crops 
A cres Per F amily Per P e r  
Farmer Size F armer Person 
2 . 9  5 . 09 1 8 0 3 5 . 4  
5 . 2  6 , 4 3  240  3 7. 3 
4 , 5  6 . 1 2  280  4 5 . 8  
1 6 . 8  8 . 2 1  340  4 1 . 4 
1 1 . 8 8 . 1 8 3 6 0  44. 0 
4 . 6  5 , 8 0  1 90 3 2 . 8  
3 . 8  5 . 3 0  2 0 0  3 7 .  7 
3 . 9  7 .  7 1  1 40 1 8 . 2 
6 . 0  6 . 5 1  240 3 6 . 9  
urc e :  DeVries ,  " T '1 e  I mportance of T raditional Agri culture i n  Zambia, 1 1
Paper  s ubmi t ted  to the A gricultural and Natural R e s ources Committee 
in the S econd :\ationa l Development Plan, Augus t 1 9 70,  p.  3 .  
1te :  The s i x  cro!'s are  those mos t  commonly and univer s ally grown by 
traditional farme r s :  maize ,  millet, sorghum, cassava ( manioc ) ,  
groundnuts , and b eans . 
The fir s t  r e s ult i s  that, once again, the farm families in the Central 
and S outhern provinces -" that i s ,  on the line of rail - - do notably better 
than farm familie s  elsewher e ;  their proximity to markets s e ems to have called 
for th larger acreages  and greater productivi ty. T he s econd is that 
while  the average returns per fai·mer are much greate r than those  
calculated by Turner ,  the  differential between the  money value of  
the average output of the subs i s tence farmer (K 2 4 0 )  and the  money
value of the average annual earnings of employee s  in 1 96 8  (K 7 89) 
i s  clear ly in the same order of magnitude. For the rural dwe ller,  
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urban migration has been an attractive alternative i n  pos t - independence · 
Zambia .  
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FIGURE I :  Percent of Total, A nnual Government Capital Investment That
Goes to Urban Dis tricts
P e rcent l 00
9 0  
80 
70  
6 0  
5 0  �1�9�6�1 --,-1 �9�4.,.......�1 �6�5,..-l-9�6�6,__,1_9-.6�7
�
1-9�6�8 
1 96 3a
( a )  Average annual 
Sour ce :  R epublic  of Zambia,  E s timates of R evenue and Expenditures for the Year (s ) 
1 96 1 - 1 96 8 ,  (Lusaka: Government Printe r ,  1 96 1 - 1 96 8 ) .  
FIGURE 2 :  Index o f  Urban Bias in Per Cafita District Government
Capital Expenditure by Year (a 
U rban Bias 
4 0 0  
3 5 0  
3 0 0  
2 5 0  
2 00 ...._ ....... �--��--�������---
1 96 1 - 1 96 4  1 96 5  1 966  1 96 7  1 96 8  
1 96 3 l b)
S ource :  R epublic  of Zambia, E s timates of R e venue and Expenditures for the Yea r ( s )  
1 96 1 - 1 96 8 ,  (Lu s aka:  Government Printe r ,  1 96 1 - 1 96 8 ) .  
Note : (a) T h e  urban bias is the ratio between the average p e r  capita capital expenditure  
by government in  urban districts to  the  average per  capita capital expenditures 
in all the districts in Zambia. 
Population e s timates for the years 1 964- 1 96 7  were interpolated on the basis 
of the · 1 96 3  and 1 96 8  census e s .  The 1 96 3  census results were used i n  1 96 1 -
1 96 3  and the ·· 1 96 B  census figures  were used for that year.  
(b) Ave rage annual 
FOOT NOTES 
L To a s s e r t  that these  changes refl e c t  a redis tribution of popu-
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lation t o  the urban areas,  we must a ssUine that the natural rate 
of g rowth of the population is uniform nationally and that inter­
national migration is r elatively unimportant. Ther e  is evidence 
that neither a s sumption is s trictly  valid, but also  that the variations 
in rates of furtility and international migration, save in g eographi.­
cally confined areas,  a r e  not  large enough to cause great  problems 
for our analysis .  See, J.  Clyde Mitchell, "Differential Fertility 
Among s t  Urban Africans in Z ambia, 1 1 The Rhodes -Living s tone 
Journal, vol. 37 , 1 9 65 and Patrick O.  Ohadike, Some D emographic 
Meas.uremen t  for Africans in Zambia, Communic;;i.tion Nw:nber  5 ,  
Ins titute for Social R e search of the University of Z ambia, 1 9 69. 
2.  This narrative is base d  upon mate rials contained in L[ ewis] H. Gann, 
A His tory of Northern Rhodesia:  Early Days to 1 9 5 3  (London : Chatto 
and Windus,  1 964) ;  R. M. Bos tock, "The Transport  Sector, " in Con­
s traints on the E conomic Development of Z ambia ed. Charles Ell io tt 
( Nairobi: Oxford Univer s i ty Press ,  1 97 1 ) , pp. 32 3 - 37 6; Robert  E. 
Baldwin, Economic Development and Export Growth: A Studv of 
Northern Rhodesia 1 9 2 0 - 1 9 6 0  ( Be rkeley and Los Ang eles ,  California: 
University of California P r e s s ,  1 966). 
3. Baldwin, Economic Development, p .  1 41.  Also, R. W.  Dean, " Changes
in Farming over  the Pas t  50 Years,  1 1 in Farming in Zambia, vol. 5 ,
no . 4, (July 1 970 ) ,  pp. 1 1 - 1 3. 
4. For purposes  of this e s s ay, we ignor e  the small centers of commer cial
farming in Nor thern and Northwestern Province and the major commer­
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